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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in striking certain portions of submitted affidavits in 
support of Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
Standard of Review: Abuse-of-discretion. In reviewing a decision to striking affidavits 
an appellate court "looks to [its] prior decisions regarding the admission of evidence 
more generally." In civil cases, where the evidence sought to be introduced does not 
raise concerns of the type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a 
trial court decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. In 
re General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah, 1999). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 357-359, 447-449, 452-454, 462]. 
Did the trial court err in determining that Appellant had no legally protectable 
interest in his position as a volunteer coach? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Schurt^ v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 
1991). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross <&Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 119 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989); see also Goodnow 
v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, f 1, 44 P.3d 704. 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 202-245, 311-352, 405-422, 448-452]. 
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3. Did the trial court err in determining that the Appellant's Amended Notice of 
Claim was inadequate to put Appellee Lehi City on notice of Appellant's 
defamation and breach of contract causes of action? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Schurt^ v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 
1991). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 119 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989); see also Goodnow 
v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 2 1 4 1, 44 P.3d 704. 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 204, 311, 445-447]. 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
1. This appeal requires the Court to determine the following questions of law: 
(1) Whether the paragraphs stricken from submitted affidavits in support of 
Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment 
were relevant, established foundation, were non-conclusory, and admissible; 
(2) Whether Appellant had a legally protectable interest in his position as a 
volunteer coach and the subsidiary questions: 
(a) Whether volunteers are entitled to the same or similar First 
Amendment protections as public employees; 
(b) Whether the individual Appellees are protected from Appellant's 42 
U.S.C. §1983 claim by a qualified immunity defense; 
(c) Whether Appellant provided clearly established legal authority from the 
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Tenth Circuit to prove that he is entitled to First Amendment 
protection even though he was a volunteer; 
(d) Whether, for purposes of his Fourteenth Amendment violation claim, 
Appellant established: (1) that he was treated differently from other 
similarly situated volunteers, and (2) that Appellees had no rational 
basis for the disparate treatment; 
(e) Whether Appellee Lehi City may be held liable for the acts of its 
employees if it is established that those employees did violate 
Appellant's constitutional rights; 
(f) Whether Appellant had constitutionally protected liberty or property 
interests sufficient to invoke Fourteenth Amendment rights; 
(g) If Appellant did have a liberty and/or property interest in volunteer 
coaching, whether the trial court's failure to analyze and determine 
Appellant's procedural due process claim was erroneous; 
(h) Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C § 
1988(b) if he establishes his 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims. 
(3) Whether Appellant strictly complied with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
401 (3)(a)(ii) even though the Amended Notice of Claim did not specifically list 
potential breach of contract and defamation claims. 
The Appellant in this case (who was Plaintiff in the underlying trial case) is William A. 
Doyle, a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
The Appellees in this case are Lehi City, a Utah municipal corporation [R. 20], Blythe 
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( 
Bray, an employee of Lehi City [R. 20], Daniel Harrison, an employee of Lehi City [R. 
19], and Amanda Len Mackintosh, an employee of Lehi City. [R. 19]. 
4. For ease of reference, this Brief will refer to Lehi City, Blythe Bray, Daniel Harrison, 
and Amanda Len Mackintosh collectively as the "Appellees." 
Course of Proceedings/Disposition of trial court. 
5. On September 6, 2007, Appellant filed a Verified Complaint in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County against Appellees. [R. 1-20]. 
6. On August 29, 2008, Appellant filed an Amended Verified Complaint in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Utah County against Appellees. [R. 38-61]. 
7. In the Amended Verified Complaint^ Appellant alleged the following eight causes of 
action: 
(1) First Amendment Retaliation; 
(2) Equal Protection; 
(3) Defamation; 
(4) Procedural Due Process - Liberty Interest; 
(5) Procedural Due Process — Property Interest; 
(6) 42 U.S.C. §1983 Cause of Action; 
(7) 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) Cause of Action; and 
(8) Breach of Contract. 
8. Appellees filed an Answer and Notice of Intent to Rely on ]ury Demand on October 6, 
2008. [R. 62-79]. 
9. On August 7, 2009, Appellees submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Motion for SummaryJudgmentand accompanying 
memorandum addressed Appellant's qualified immunity claim, constitutional claim, 
attorney fees claim, and Notice of Claim. [R. 97-100, 201-245]. 
10. Appellant filed a Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on August 
31,2009. [R. 250-352]. 
11. On September 21, 2009, Appellees filed a Motion to Strike Affidavits with an 
accompanying memorandum. [R. 353-361]. 
12. Appellees filed a Reply Memoranda in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 21, 2009. [R. 121,128]. 
13. Appellant filed a Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion to Strike on October 5, 2009. 
[R. 423-428]. 
14. Appellees filed a Reply Memoranda in support of the Motion to Strike Affidavits on 
October 19, 2009. [R. 429-435]. 
15. After the trial court heard oral arguments on December 14, 2009 [R. 475, p. 1-45] and 
on January 11, 2010 [R. 476, p. 1-47], the trial court issued its ruling on March 23, 
2010 [R. 443-464] and entered an Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Motion to Strike on May 3, 2010. [R. 465-467]. 
16. In its March 23, 2010 Ruling, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees on all claims brought by Appellant. The trial court generally determined the 
following [R. 464]: 
a. Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity as to any Constitutional-based 
claim; 
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b. Appellant was not a public employee, but a volunteer; therefore, Appellant 
had no legally protectable interest in coaching; < 
c. Because the individual Appellees did not violate Appellant's rights (if any), 
Appellant's claims must fail as a matter of law; 
d. Appellant had no constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest in his 
position as a volunteer for the City; 
e. An analysis of any alleged procedural due process violation is unnecessary 
because Appellant had no protected liberty or property interest to speak of; 
f. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) is not a separate cause of action, and at any rate, the court 
has discretion to award fees only to a prevailing party. Because Appellant did 
not prevail, he is not entkled to attorney's fees; 
g. Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim did not contain any claim for breach of 
contract or defamation. Accordingly, those two claims merit dismissal; 
h. Appellant did not allege detrimental reliance and, therefore, could not claim 
promissory estoppel with respect to his coaching position. 
17. The trial court determined that the following affidavits and their respective 
paragraphs should be stricken for being irrelevant, lacking in foundation, conclusory, 
containing inadmissible opinion testimony, and/or hearsay [R. 452-454]: 
Affidavit 
Bridgit Doyle 
James Johnston 
Alan Paul 
Joyce Olson 
Sharon Johnston 
Wayne Stanley Crump 
Roger Dean 
Paragraph(s) 
8,11,12,13,14,15,16 and 17 
8,10,11,12,13,14 and 15 
7, 8,10,11,12 and 13 
8, 9 and 10 
8 
7 
6 
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18. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal on May 10, 2010. [R. 468-470]. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Parties and Background. 
19. This case involves the termination of Appellant William A. Doyle ("Appellant") from 
his position as a volunteer coach for Appellee Lehi City. [R. 100]. 
20. Lehi City is a municipality that offers formalized youth sports programs to its 
residents. [R. 238]. 
21. Lehi City operates the "Legacy Center," a gym and sports center located in Lehi 
City. [R. 238]. 
22. At all relevant times, Appellee Dan Harrison ("Harrison") was employed by Lehi 
City as the Director of the Legacy Center. [R. 238]. 
23. At all relevant times, Appellee Blythe Bray ("Bray") was the Youth Sports Director at 
the Legacy Center. [R. 238]. 
24. Harrison was Bray's immediate supervisor. [R. 234]. 
25. At all relevant limes, Appellee Amanda Mackintosh ("Mackintosh") was employed by 
Lehi City as a youth sports field supervisor. [R. 238]. 
26. Appellant has been a volunteer coach for Lehi City's youth baseball program since 
1981. [R. 463]. 
27. Through his participation in the Lehi City's youth baseball program, Appellant 
established a reputation within the community as a dedicated and skilled coach and a 
man of good character and moral integrity. [R. 60]. 
28. Pursuant to the Volunteer Code of Conduct for Lehi City, volunteers are subject to 
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the same standards of performance as regular employees, drug tests and background 
checks. [R. 59, 77]. 
29. Appellant had taken and passed the "Set a Good Example" (S.A.G.E.) program 
required by Lehi City before participating in the Lehi City's youth baseball program. 
Appellant received a card certifying that he had taken the S.A.G.E. class and was in 
good standing to continue coaching youth baseball for Lehi City. [R. 59]. 
30. During the 2006 baseball season, Appellant and his team, the "A's," finished in first 
place in regular season play, won the Lehi City tournament and placed third in the 
State tournament. [R. 59, 77]. 
31. At the beginning of the 2006 season, Bray announced a change in procedure that 
allowed certain teams to be unfairly stacked with an inordinate and disproportionate 
amount of talented players. [R. 59]. 
32. Appellant voiced his concerns to Bray that the method by which the draft was 
conducted was unfair to participants of Lehi City's baseball program. [R. 59, 77]. 
33. Throughout the 2006 season, Appellant voiced his concerns to Bray and other 
members of the community regarding other matters of fairness and safety raised by 
the administration of Lehi City's baseball program. [R. 58, 77]. 
34. In July 2006, after the season had ended, Bray, on two separate occasions 
affirmatively represented to both Appellant and his spouse, Bridgit Doyle that 
Appellant would definitely coach a team for the 2007 youth baseball season. [R. 58]. 
Termination of the Appellant as Volunteer. 
35. In July 2006, Bray met with Harrison to discuss her concerns about Appellant and 
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possible violations of the Volunteer Code of Conduct (which included allegations 
that Appellant had periodically acted in an angry manner towards Legacy Center 
personnel and/or umpires and had occasionally used the word "bullshit" in front of 
some of the children). [R. 230]. 
36. Bray and Harrison decided to wait until the following season to see if Doyle would 
apply for a volunteer coaching position before deciding on the appropriate course of 
action. [R. 229]. 
37. In late March of 2007, Appellant completed and filed a Volunteer Coach Application 
for the 2007 season. [R. 229]. 
38. After Appellant submitted the application, Bray met with Harrison to discuss what 
course of action to take. [R. 229]. 
39. To prepare for discussing the issue of Appellant's alleged behavior in the 2006 
season, Harrison asked Bray to prepare a list of each incident involving Appellant's 
behavior of which she was aware. [R. 229]. 
40. Bray prepared a list of each incident of Appellant's conduct that she believed violated 
the Volunteer Code of Conduct or which she believed was disruptive to the program, 
its employees, and other volunteers. [R. 229]. 
41. The list included seven "instances" of allegedly disruptive behavior: three instances of 
yelling about policies or programs, two instances of Appellant coming in to 
Harrison's office to talk about a policy or program, one instance of starting a petition 
concerning the recreational programs at the ballpark, and one instance of Appellant 
appearing at Bray's office with his wife and other individuals to discuss a problem 
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that occurred at one of the games. [R. 183]. 
42. At least three of the instances cited by Bray could not be categorized as inappropriate < 
(an "OK" is written next to those instances), and importantly, in only one instance is 
there an indication that Appellant used "inappropriate language." [R. 183]. 
43. Ultimately Bray and Harrison jointly decided that, based upon alleged observations of 
" improper conduct" on the part of Appellant by several individuals, Appellant would 
be declined a volunteer position for the youth baseball program for the 2007 season. 
[R. 228]. 
44. On March 27, 2007, Harrison met with Appellant and informed Appellant that he 
was prohibited from coaching youth baseball for the 2007 season due to complaints 
about his behavior. [R. 58, 76, 228]. 
45. Harrison told Appellant that Appellant could coach football or basketball, but not 
basebaU. [R. 58; 76]. 
46. Harrison told Appellant that if he would keep Bray "happy," Appellant could have a 
team the following year. [R. 58]. 
47. During the March 27, 2007meeting with Harrison, Appellant was never given any 
type of official written documentation to support Bray's decision. [R. 58]. 
48. Harrison also reviewed the list of seven reasons with Appellant that Bray had 
provided him as the basis for her decision to prohibit Appellant from coaching 
basebaU. [R. 58-59, 76]. 
49. Appellant disputed the characterization of his actions, and argued that Harrison never 
investigated Bray's accusations to determine their accuracy. Appellant also noted that 
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Lehi City had never provided prior written notice of any violation or basis for 
termination prior to actual termination, and that he had no opportunity to for a 
review hearing or other proceeding prior to his termination. [R. 56]. 
50. Appellant contends that he was prohibited from serving as a volunteer baseball coach 
because he voiced concerns to his superiors over issues of fairness concerning the 
youth participants and how the program was being run. Appellant also argues that he 
was prohibited from serving as a volunteer baseball coach in an effort to limit his 
speech concerning the administration of a publicly organized program and to retaliate 
against Appellant for engaging in speech on a matter of public concern. [R. 305]. 
51. The list of seven instances prepared by Bray clearly indicates that one reason 
Appellant was expressly prohibited from volunteering as a baseball coach was 
because he "started a petition concerning the recreation programs (sports) in Lehi 
[and] tried to get signatures at the ballpark." [R. 57, 183]. 
52. In fact, after Harrison informed Appellant that he would be prohibited from 
coaching baseball, he warned Appellant not to start a petition because petitions were 
"a sign of weakness." Appellant was prohibited from coaching Lehi City baseball 
because he had engaged in lawful speech concerning the fair administration of the 
baseball program and other safety matters. [R. 53, 55]. 
53. Bray and Harrison acted in a manner that tarnished and impeached Appellant's 
integrity, virtue, and reputation within the community. [R. 55]. 
54. The other reasons cited by Bray and Harrison for prohibiting Appellant's 
involvement with the baseball program were either fabricated, exaggerated, or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pretextual. Appellant believes the motivations were pre-textual insofar as he was 
permitted to continue coaching basketball and football while being denied the 
opportunity to coach baseball. Furthermore, Bray and Harrison explicitly referenced 
their disapproval of Appellant's efforts to begin a petition. [R. 55-56]. 
55. There was no attempt by Lehi City to investigate or verify Bray's accusations against 
Appellant, and no file or documentation existed in support of those accusations prior 
to or at the time Appellant was denied the 2007 volunteer opportunity. R. 54]. 
56. Appellant filed a Verified Complaint in District Court September 6, 2007. [R. 20]. 
57. The Complaint alleged 10 separate causes of action: (1) First Amendment Retaliation, 
(2) Equal Protection, (3) Defamation, (4) Procedural Due Process - Liberty Interest, 
(5) Procedural Due Process - Property Interest, (6) 42 U.S.C. §1983 Cause of Action, 
(7) 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) Cause of Action, (8) Breach of Contract, (9) Equitable 
Estoppel, and (10) Attorney Fees. [R. 3-13]. 
SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously struck paragraphs from the affidavits of Bridgit Doyle, 
James Johnston, Alan Paul, Joyce Olson, Sharon Johnston, Wayne Stanley Crump, and 
Roger Dean. The paragraphs that were struck, however, were based upon personal 
knowledge, show the existence of disputed fact, contain relevant information, and are 
provided by competent witnesses, thereby satisfying the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
Furthermore, the trial court erred in determining that fact issues raised in Appellant's own 
affidavit were immaterial. 
The trial court erroneously determined that there was insufficient Tenth Circuit case 
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law to support Appellant's contention that volunteers have similar or the same First 
Amendment rights as public employees. The trial court failed to consider all facts detailed in 
the leading Tenth Circuit case on the issue, Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 
1996), which establishes that volunteers have the similar or the same constitutional 
protections under the First Amendment. 
The trial court erroneously determined that the individual Appellees were entided to 
qualified immunity against Appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because volunteers do not 
have clearly established First Amendment protections or a protectable interest in keeping 
their volunteer jobs. Appellant argues, on the contrary, that volunteers do have such 
protections and interests and that the individual Appellees violated Appellant's clearly 
established constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have known. Appellant 
also argues that Appellant provided clearly established legal authority from the Tenth Circuit 
to establish that he is entitled to First Amendment protection despite his volunteer status. 
With respect to his Fourteenth Amendment violation claim, Appellant properly 
established: (1) that he was treated differently from other similarly situated volunteers, and 
(2) that Appellees had no rational basis for their disparate treatment in terminating his 
baseball coaching position for the 2007 season. Appellant contends that Lehi City may be 
held liable for the acts of its employees if it is established that those employees did violate 
Appellant's constitutional rights. 
Appellant argues that he had constitutionally protected liberty or property interests 
sufficient to invoke Fourteenth Amendment rights; and if Appellant did have a liberty 
and/or property interest in volunteer coaching, the trial court's failure to analyze and 
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determine Appellant's procedural due process claim was erroneous. 
If Appellant establishes his 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims, he would be entitled to attorney's i 
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988(b). 
Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly determined that his Amended 
Notice of Claim did not strictly comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("UGIA") because Appellant did not specifically list 
"breach of contract" or "defamation" as causes of action. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401 
does not require a claimant to list specific causes of action in the notice of claim. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in striking certain portions of submitted affidavits in 
support of Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees* Motion for 
Summary Judgmentbecause the portions of the submitted affidavits complied 
with the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Because there is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits, 
the standard of review for the admission of evidence "varies depending on the type of 
evidence at issue." In civil cases, where the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise 
concerns of the type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity, a trial court 
decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. In re General 
Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah, 1999). 
B. The trial court improperly excluded relevant affidavit testimony in favor 
of Appellant's legal position. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) establishes the standard for summary judgment and provides in 
relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
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to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) further indicates: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
The bases upon which the trial court actually decided to strike certain portions of 
affidavits favorable to Appellant (thus removing any potential material fact "in controversy" 
and paving the way for summary judgment in favor of Appellees) are as follows: (1) 
Appellant had made inappropriate comments in a public forum, (2) affidavit testimony 
offered by witnesses favorable to the Appellees was relevant, and (3) affidavit testimony in 
direct contradiction to Appellees' affidavits and in support of Appellant was immaterial. 
Material facts in this case would be those that relate to: (1) Whether Appellant was 
banned from the voluntary coaching program because he publically raised an issue of 
concern about violations by the Lehi City in the sports program; (2) Whether Appellant, not 
in his capacity as citizen, but in his capacity as coach, had a right to raise such issues as they 
direcdy impacted the children who he coached, and the other children in the league in 
general, who could not represent themselves; and (3) Whether Appellant expressed himself 
inappropriately before children in violation of the rules so as to make his exclusion from 
coaching appropriate. Evidence from witnesses with personal knowledge about any of these 
three areas would be material. 
Controversy cannot be "balanced" or "eliminated" by simply erasing one side of the 
ledger. The purpose of trial is to grant a forum for legitimate controversies to be aired in the 
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interest of justice. Summary judgment is only appropriate when, as a natural result of review, 
it is determined that there is no controversy—not because of systematic elimination by the < 
trial court of sworn statements permitted under Rule 56 to establish the existence of two 
opposing points of view. 
In Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah, 1997) the Utah Supreme Court 
warned that such a practice could be the equivalent of dismissal by discovery sanction rather 
than by a legitimate elimination of immaterial statements. In that case, the defendant (Ford 
Motor Company) sought summary judgment because the plaintiff (Drysdale) did not retain 
the wreck of his Ford vehicle that resulted from an accident based on what he called a defect 
caused in the automobile by Ford Motor Company. Although Drysdale had no control over 
the destruction of the remains of the vehicle, Ford Motor Company argued that the lack of 
material evidence meant that Drysdale could not establish his claim in any case. 
After concluding that the trial court mistakenly granted summary judgment for Ford 
Motor Company under improper conditions, the Drysdale court advised that "|l]itigants 
must be able to present their cases fully to the courts before judgment can be rendered 
against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the party opposing 
judgment can establish no right to recovery." Id. at 680. (Internal citations and emphasis 
omitted). In Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17,1J24, 42 P.3d 379, the court 
reiterated that "[a] trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary 
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists." 
As will be discussed, the trial court in the instant case impermissibly weighed facts 
and then relied upon those facts in deciding to grant summary judgment in favor of 
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Appellees. 
C. The affidavits submitted on behalf of Appellant comply with Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(e) and are otherwise admissible. 
When considering the admissibility of the affidavit testimony provided on behalf of 
Appellant (and submitted for purposes of opposing summary judgment) it is clear the trial 
court erred in striking those paragraphs where the affiant had personal knowledge, the 
evidence was admissible, and the affiant was competent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Only in 
the presence of a clear violation in form and substance against this Rule 56(e) would the trial 
court be justified in striking portions of the affidavits. 
L Appellant's personal affidavit was material to the legal issues 
presented. 
In considering Appellant's personal affidavit, the trial court noted that "[m]uch of the 
affidavit is direcdy contradictory to the many affidavits of Defendants." [R. 453]. Specifically, 
Appellant's affidavit contains denials that he ever yelled or cursed in front of players, 
umpires, etc. In spite of Appellant's counter-testimony, though, the trial court determined 
that "the fact issues raised in Plaintiffs affidavits are not material to the analysis and 
determination of this case, and ... Defendants are entided to summary judgment as a matter 
of law." [R. 454]. No violation of form is cited; the trial court merely deemed all of 
Appellant's affidavit statements "immaterial." 
Utah R. Evid. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 402 
provides that "all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
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Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by 
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state." < 
Utah R. Civ. P 56(e) provides that: "[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein." 
Appellant's affidavit was: (1) made on personal knowledge, (2) factually admissible in 
accord with Rules 401 and 402, and (3) shows that affiant is competent to testify. 
By complying with the above-standards, it must next be determined why the trial 
court deemed the factual issues raised in Appellant's affidavit immaterial. 
Appellee principal defense in justifying Appellant's termination as a volunteer coach 
was that Appellant exhibited abusive behavior including yelling, cursing, and fighting with 
umpires, scorekeepers, and opposing coaches and that such behavior violated the Volunteer 
Code of Conduct. [R. 240, 331-350]. However, Appellant's affidavit is replete with 
statements defending himself from these accusations. [R. 304-309]. 
The trial court appears to have forgotten that the primary controversy raised by the 
case is not "whether Lehi City was justified in restricting Appellant from continuing to 
volunteer as coach" (although this may be a defense); rather it is a controversy about 
whether Appellant was improperly and illegally banned because he publically brought to light 
the truth about the improper behavior of certain Lehi City officials in the operation of the 
recreational programs involving youth baseball teams that cheated the youth, violated the 
Code of Conduct, and compromised the integrity of the programs. 
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Appellant's volunteer track record stretching back to 1981 without prior dismissal or 
a demonstrated record of complaints, stands as a foundation as to the veracity of the 
statements made by Appellant in his supporting affidavit. The Appellees' efforts to remove 
Appellant from the volunteer position only after he complained about the changes in the 
recreational program (and to action against those changes) support Appellant's contention 
that the attempt to ban him from coaching really had nothing to do with any alleged 
behavior in front of players, spectators, or with umpires; it was indeed a reaction of certain 
individuals acting under a bureaucratic pretense to guard against public disclosure of their 
actions. 
Among other things, Appellant's affidavit directly counters the principal allegations of 
the individual Appellees (and witness Kimberly Martinez) that Appellant was verbally 
abusive, threatening, and used inappropriate language in front of the youth participants, 
coaches, umpires or other staff members. [R. 304-309]. Why the trial court deemed 
Appellant's entire affidavit statement "immaterial" is never explained in the March 23, 2010 
Ruling. The trial court fails to recognize that Appellant's affidavit is highly material insofar as 
it direcdy rebuts many of the Appellees' allegations—allegations that form the basis for the 
pretext that Appellant was terminated as a coach for reasons other than exercising his right to 
speak publicly about the baseball program. If the trial court was willing to accept the entirety 
of the affidavit testimony submitted by Appellees in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment as material to the legal issues, it should have done the same for Appellant. 
Conversely, if all of the factual matters asserted in Appellant's affidavit (matters direcdy 
relating to Appellant's behavior, attitude, interactions, rationale for objecting to certain 
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procedures, tangible benefits derived from coaching, etc.) are "immaterial" to the legal 
issues, then all of Appellees' affidavit statements relating to those same matters should be < 
deemed immaterial as well. 
iL The other affidavits offered in support of Appellant's 
Memorandum in Opposition are admissible and should not 
have been stricken. 
The trial court erred in striking portions of affidavits submitted by various individuals 
in support of Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The affidavits (marked Exhibits 2 through 8 to the Memorandum in Opposition [R. 277-302]) 
were based upon personal knowledge, show the existence of disputed facts, contain relevant 
information and were provided by competent witnesses—thus satisfying the requirements of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
The particular statements stricken by the trial court were not based on unsubstantiated 
beliefs, but on observations based upon personal firsthand knowledge and should have been 
considered as evidence. The statements contained in the affidavits raise genuine issues of 
material fact as to the specific circumstances surrounding Appellant's actions and behaviors 
as a coach. The witnesses who provided affidavits were competent do so and the foundation 
for their knowledge was established by their participation in the Lehi City's baseball program 
that enabled them to acquire firsthand knowledge of material issues at dispute in this case. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in striking relevant statements in the following 
affidavits for the following reasons: 
(1) Affidavit of Bridgit Doyle: Paragraph 8 is not based on hearsay but firsthand 
knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation of the 
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conduct. Paragraph 10 is substantiated by the affiant's personal observation of conduct, it 
can be considered for impeachment purposes, and is direcdy relevant to counter allegations 
made by Appellees. Paragraph 11 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on personal 
knowledge that is direcdy probative of material issues. Paragraphs 12-15 are direct assertions 
of material facts witnessed firsthand. Paragraphs 16-17 direcdy contradict material facts 
alleged and relied upon by Appellees in justifying their removal of Appellant from his 
coaching position. 
(2) Affidavit of James Johnston: Paragraph 8 is not hearsay but is based on firsthand 
knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation. 
Paragraph 10 is based on personal observation of conduct, can be rightly considered for 
impeachment purposes, and is direcdy relevant to the substance of Appellees' opposing 
testimony. Paragraph 11 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on personal knowledge that is 
direcdy probative of material issues. Paragraphs 12-15 contain direct assertions of material 
facts witnessed firsthand. Paragraphs 16-17 are relevant as direcdy contradicting material 
facts alleged and relied upon by Appellees. 
(3) Affidavit of Alan Paul: Paragraph 7 is not hearsay, is based upon firsthand knowledge 
and has a factual foundation as established in paragraphs 1-3 of the affidavit. Paragraph 8 is 
not hearsay, but based on firsthand knowledge founded upon active participation in the 
matter and personal observation of the conduct. Paragraph 10 can be righdy considered for 
impeachment purposes and is directly relevant to the substance of contradictory statements 
provided by Appellees. Paragraphs 11-13 are direct assertions of material facts witnessed 
firsthand. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(4) Affidavit of Joyce Olson: Paragraph 8 is not hearsay but is based on firsthand 
knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation of the \ 
conduct. Paragraph 9 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on personal knowledge that are 
directly probative of material issues. Paragraph 10 is substantiated by personal observation 
of the conduct, and can be rightly considered for impeachment purposes. 
(5) Affidavit of Sharon Johnson: Paragraph 8 is not hearsay but is based on firsthand 
knowledge founded upon active participation in the matter and personal observation of the 
conduct. 
(6) Affidavit of Stanley Crump: Paragraph 7 is not hearsay but is based upon firsthand 
knowledge and the opinion stated is has a factual foundation as established in Paragraph 3. 
(7) Affidavit of Roger Dean: Paragraph 6 is not hearsay but alleges facts based on 
personal knowledge that is directly probative of material issues. 
The trial court's striking of the foregoing statements from the affidavits submitted in favor 
of Appellant's position was an abuse of discretion insofar as there was insufficient legal basis 
to do so. Accordingly, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the trial court's decision to strike 
these particular affidavit statements. 
2. The trial court erred in determining that Appellant had illegally protectable 
interest in his position as a volunteer coach. 
A. Standard of Review. 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the appropriateness of a grant of summary judgment, this 
Court views "the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no 
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deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness." Blue Cross &Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989); 
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, \ 1, 44 P.3d 704. 
B. The Trial Court's Analysis. 
The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment against Appellant on all of his 
constitutional-based claims on the following grounds (which are set forth here in the order 
in which the trial court presented in its March 23, 2010 Ruling): 
(1) Appellant was not a public employee. Appellant was a volunteer who had no legally 
protectable interest in youth coaching. [R. 451-452]. 
(2) Because Appellant had no legally protectable interest, the individual defendants sued in the 
case (Harrison, Bray, Mackintosh) have qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit because such 
immunity inheres if the individual(s)' conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Here, it was not 
"clearly established" that Appellant had a statutory or constitutional right to continue in his 
volunteer position as a coach, and Harrison, Bray and Mackintosh could not have known of 
such a right even assuming arguendo that the right to volunteer as a coach was legally 
protectable. [R. 451]. 
3) Cases outside the Tenth Circuit are not relevant in determining whether a volunteer can ever 
claim a legally protectable interest in his or her position. Because there are no Tenth Circuit 
cases clearly on point on the question of whether a volunteer has a legally protectable 
interest, Appellant has failed to provide sufficiently clear authority in support of such a 
proposition. [R. 450]. 
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4) Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection cause of action is premised on 
Appellant's argument that he was engaged in First Amendment protected speech, but was i 
treated differently than other similarly situated coaches. However, Appellant has not shown 
he was treated differently than other similarly situated coaches. Even assuming Appellant 
was treated differently, Appellant has also not shown that Lehi City did not have "rational 
basis for the difference in treatment." [R. 450]. 
(5) Because none of the individual Lehi City employees violated any constitutional rights 
Appellant may have had, Lehi City cannot be held liable for any alleged violation of 
Appellant's constitutional rights. [R. 449]. 
(6) Appellant did not have a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Appellant did 
not receive monetary or other tangible benefits from coaching. [R. 449]. 
(7) Having concluded that Appellant had no liberty or property interest in volunteer coaching, 
the trial court need not analyze Appellant's claims for denial of procedural due process. [R. 
448]. 
(8) 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) is not a separate cause of action, but only allows the trial court discretion 
to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in certain federally created actions (e.g. § 1983). 
Because the trial court dismissed Appellant's § 1983 action, no basis exists under § 1988(b) 
for any award of fees. 
Appellant will address each of these grounds in order. 
C. Appellant had a legally protectable interest in his position despite his 
"volunteer" status. 
In dismissing Appellant's constitutional-based claims, the trial court first determined 
that under applicable Tenth Circuit case law, Appellant had no legally protectable interest in 
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volunteer youth coaching. [R. 451-452]. The trial court based its decision on language found 
in the leading case on the matter, Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996).1 
One of the central questions addressed by the Andersen court was whether the 
plaintiff (Ms. Andersen) was strictly a volunteer, or whether she was a public employee. Id. at 
726. After weighing a variety of factors2 and reviewing Utah's statutory definitions of the 
terms "employee" and "volunteer," the Andersen court ultimately concluded that "Ms. 
Andersen was not a volunteer—she was obviously a government employee." Id. 
In reaching the conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to First Amendment 
protection to voice his opinions about league policies because he had no legally protectable 
interest as a volunteer, the trial court in the instant case focused on the distinction that the 
plaintiff in Andersen received some monetary compensation and educational credit, while the 
Appellant was unpaid. [R. 451-452]. Appellant acknowledges this distinction; but the trial 
court utterly failed to recognize the clear position of the Andersen court that even unpaid 
volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection: 
When acting as a sovereign, the government may not, in the absence of 
justification, restrict an individual's right to speak freely on matters of public 
1
 Ms. Andersen was an intern with Utah Department of Corrections who sought injunctive 
relief against the Department and monetary relief against various corrections officials, 
claiming that she was fired in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment free speech 
rights after publicly criticizing proposed changes in the Department's sex-offender treatment 
program. Andersen, 100 F.3d at 725. 
2
 The Andersen court found that though she was an intern, Ms. Andersen was compensated 
for her services; she was paid for twenty hours of work per week by the Board of Pardons 
and received a nonmonetary benefit in the form of educational credit in exchange for her 
continued participation in the State program. The court noted that Ms. Andersen worked 
under the direction of officials at the Bonneville Community Corrections Center, and was 
subject to their control. Finally, the fact that Ms. Andersen's employment position was 
terminable at will did not diminish her First Amendment claim. Andersen, 100 F.3d at 726. 
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import, nor may the government indirectly exert leverage to suppress speech 
by unconstitutionally tying the receipt of benefits to the speaker's coerced 
silence. We hold that Ms. Andersen's termination from her employment 
position as an intern with the DOC because of her public comment on the 
DOC's proposed changes in the sex-offender treatment program implicated 
her First Amendment rights, and invoked the protections afforded by the 
Pickering balancing test. However, even if we accepted Defendants' 
arguments and considered Ms. Andersen a nonpaid volunteer, her claim 
would not be defeated. Defendants argue that volunteers are not 
entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering. We disagree. 
The exercise of free speech rights is not dependent upon the receipt of a 
full-time salary. "[0]ur modern 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine holds 
that the government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
infringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech'...." Board of 
County CommWs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, — , 116 S.Ct. 2342, 2347,135 L.Ed.2d 
843 (1996) (quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697). For example, the 
Court has recognized a variety of benefits which cannot be denied solely 
because of the exercise of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72-
73, 110 S.Ct. at 2735-36 (promotion or transfer in a government job); Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327 n. 6, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 
(1969) (welfare benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05, 83 S.Ct. 
1790, 1794-95, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (unemployment benefits); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341-42, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) 
(tax exemptions). (Emphasis added). 
Andersen, 100 F.3d at 727. 
The Andersen court's disagreement with the proposition that volunteers are not 
entitled to First Amendment protection under Pickering is direct and unqualified. In fact, the 
entire tone of the Andersen decision is one that recognizes that significant weight must be 
given to broader constitutional principles when considering actions that inhibit free speech. 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a 
person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the 
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are 
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a 
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government 
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected 
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be 
penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to produce a result 
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which [it] could not command direcdy. Such interference with constitutional 
rights is impermissible (internal citations omitted). 
Andersen, 100 F.3d at 726-27. 
The Andersen court even goes to pains (contra the position of the defendants in that 
case) to reference other cases where volunteers have the same First Amendment protections 
to free speech as an employee. Andersen, 100 F.3d at 726-27. (See Hj/and P. Wonder, 972 F.2d 
1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that volunteer status is a valuable governmental benefit 
or privilege that may not be denied on the basis of constitutionally protected speech); cert, 
denied, 508 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 2337, 124 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer 
Fire Dep% 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the dismissal of a volunteer firefighter 
for complaining about low morale and inadequate training and discipline can violate.the First 
Amendment)). 
The Supreme Court has stated that the type of sanction imposed "need not be 
particularly great in order to find that rights have been violated." Elrod v. Burns, All U.S. 
347, 359 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2683 n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Appellant's status as a 
volunteer is the type of role that constitutes the type of governmental benefit or privilege the 
deprivation of which can trigger First Amendment protection. The trial court focused 
exclusively (and wrongly) on the fact that Appellant was unpaid for his volunteer efforts. In 
fact, Appellant had volunteered since 1981 and gained valuable experience and education 
while administering his duties with the youth baseball team. This opportunity to serve also 
provided Appellant with the satisfaction of giving something back to the public. Even if the 
trial court considered these trivialities, they were very important benefits in the eyes of the 
Appellant. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
D. Appellees Bray and Harrison are not entitled to "qualified immunity" 
against Appellant's claim for violation of his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. 
L The qualified immunity standard. 
Qualified immunity is "an affirmative defense to be asserted by a government official 
performing discretionary functions. It is premised on the contention that the challenged 
conduct was undertaken in good faith or did not violate clearly established law or 
constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800,102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 
In assessing a defense of qualified immunity, a court must determine the objective 
reasonableness of the challenged conduct by reference to the law clearly established at the 
time of the constitutional violation. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 696 (10th Cir.1990), cert, 
denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1622,113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991). The burden rests with the 
plaintiff to come forward with facts or allegations to show the violation of a clearly 
established right. Id.; Hannula v. City o/Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129,131 (10th Cir.1990). 
iL The trial court's analysis of qualified immunity. 
In the case at bar, the trial court determined in conclusory fashion that the language 
in Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996) (which affirms that a volunteer would 
be afforded First Amendment protections) was "dicta" and did not create a "clearly 
established" constitutional right for the purpose of Appellant's § 1983 claims. [R. 451]. As a 
result, the trial court concluded that there was no way that the individual Appellees could 
have knowingly violated any constitutional right that Appellant might have had. 
Of course, the trial court's conclusion rests wholly upon the premise that the Andersen 
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decision was insufficient to establish the principle that volunteers have a legally protectable 
interest in maintaining their jobs and that volunteers are protected from government 
reprisals when they exercise First Amendment rights. Appellants have already argued in 
section 2(c) of this brief that the Andersen decision (as well as Supreme Court and other 
federal circuit court cases), clearly establishes that volunteers have a legally protectable 
interest when they engage in First Amendment-covered free speech. If this Court determines 
that the Andersen ruling clearly establishes such a principle, then the trial court's premise is 
faulty, and the question of whether the individual Appellees have a legitimate "qualified 
immunity" defense is "back on the table." 
Without citing any affidavit or other factual testimony, the trial court finished its 
analysis with this pronouncement: "No reasonable governmental official would have 
recognized that not selecting [Appellant] to serve as a volunteer baseball could would have 
violated [Appellant's] constitutional rights" [R. 450]. While convenient, this type of "end-
game" ultimate ruling is premature and legally inappropriate given the fact-sensitive nature 
of the case and that the issue was being considered under a summary judgment standard. 
The heart of Appellant's complaint was that the Appellees wrongfully deprived him of a 
volunteer position specifically because he raised concerns about changes in the recreational 
program (which Appellant believed affected the fairness and well-being of the youth 
participants). The motives and behaviors of the Appellees are highly relevant, and an inquiry 
into their motives and behaviors is highly fact-sensitive. The trial court mistakenly placed 
itself in the position of a "reasonable government official" and granted summary judgment 
without allowing Appellant the full and fair opportunity to vindicate his theory through 
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deposition or trial 
E. Appellant provided appropriate authority from the Tenth Circuit to 
establish that he is entitled to First Amendment protection even though 
he was a volunteer. 
The trial court correctly noted the standard a plaintiff must meet in order overcome 
the "qualified immunity defense" and prove that a "clearly established law" was in effect at 
the time the alleged § 1983 violation occurred. In its analysis, the trial court referred to Foote 
v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,1424 (10th Cir. 1997). The relevant paragraph from Foote indicates: 
When a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity on 
summary judgment, the plaintiff must show the law was clearly established 
when the alleged violation occurred and must come forward with sufficient 
facts to show the official violated that clearly established law. The defendant 
bears the normal summary judgment burden of showing no material facts that 
would defeat the qualified immunity defense remain in dispute. For the law to 
be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit 
decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other 
courts must be as plaintiff maintains. V-1 Oil Co. v. Means, 94 F.3d 1420, 1423 
(10hCir.l996). 
The trial court then simply announced that the Andersen decision was not "on point" 
and that Appellant had not shown by the clear weight of extra-judicial authority that a 
volunteer would be entitled to First Amendment protections on par with a public employee. 
[R. 450]. 
This is an incorrect assessment of the law and the presentation of the law set forth in 
Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary judgment that was 
before the trial court. In the Memorandum in Opposition, Appellant detailed the holding in 
Andersen (a Tenth Circuit case) and cited to Supreme Court and other federal circuit court 
decisions that directly support Appellant's contention that volunteers have a protectable 
First Amendment right to free speech. [R. 325-326]. 
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As a volunteer, Appellant received non-monetary benefits and was improperly 
dismiss from his position for exercising his First Amendment rights by bringing to light the 
improper operation of recreational programs in Lehi City. 
It is unclear of what further degree of judicial authority the trial court was asking 
Appellant to invoke. The Andersen court left no doubt as to the fact that unpaid volunteers 
would be entitled to First Amendment protection, and the authority cited in that decision 
(Second and Ninth Circuit Courts and the United States Supreme Court) affirms the general 
principle that a governmental entity may revoke a volunteer's position on a basis that 
infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of 
speech. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to consider the judicial authority presented 
by Appellant, to find that a volunteer's First Amendment rights are protectable and to 
reverse the trial court's legal conclusion. 
F. For purposes of his Fourteenth Amendment violation claim, Appellant 
has established: (1) that he was treated differently from other similarly 
situated volunteers, and (2) that Appellees had no rational basis for the 
disparate treatment. 
The "purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper 
execution through duly constituted agents." Village ofWillowhrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 
120 S.Ct. 1073,145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). 
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that "a plaintiff need not be a 
member of a traditionally 'protected class' in order to allege an equal protection violation." 
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Tuskowski v. Griffin, 359 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Conn.2005); see also Harvey v. Mark, 352 
F.Supp.2d 285, 290 (D.Conn.2005). Rather, a plaintiff may maintain a "class of one" equal 
protection claim, as long as the plaintiff alleges that he or she was treated differendy than 
similarly situated persons, and there was no rational basis for that differential treatment. Id. 
(citing Village ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564,120 S.Ct. 1073). 
Appellant is able to show that Appellees treated him differently than others similarly 
situated and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. For example, 
during the 2006 season, Appellant acted no differently than any other similarly situated youth 
baseball coaches in Lehi, and Appellant did not engage in any conduct that violated the 
Volunteer Code of Conduct. [R. 304-309]. 
Importandy, the Harrison instructed Bray to create an "incident" list after Appellant 
publicly agitated for changes to the baseball programs drafting procedures. The various 
incident reports ultimately created by "witnesses" against Appellant were not even in 
existence during the 2006 season and are clearly after the fact rationalizations used to justify 
and support Harrison and Bray's decision to exclude Appellant from coaching for the 2007 
youth baseball season. 
Appellant's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated 
by Bray and Harrison because Appellant's conduct was the same as any other coach in the 
league yet Appellant was arbitrarily and capriciously singled out for disparate treatment. 
G. If individual Lehi City employees did violate Appellant's constitutional 
rights, Appellee Lehi City may be held liable for said violations. 
After determining that none of the individual Appellees violated any of Appellant's 
rights, the trial court concluded that Appellee Lehi City could not be held vicariously liable 
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for any alleged constitutional violations. [R. 449]. Appellant agrees with the general principle 
relied upon by the trial court in reaching its conclusion ("A municipality may not be held 
liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers." Camuglia 
v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006)). However, if this Court finds that 
summary judgment was improperly granted as to Appellant's § 1983 claims, Lehi City's 
liability would become an open issue that would be determined only after further 
proceedings in the trial court. 
H. Appellant did have constitutionally protected property and liberty 
interests even though he did not receive monetary benefits from 
coaching. 
"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of 
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." 
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). "To have a 
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or 
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it." Id. at 577. Property 
interests (as opposed to liberty interests) are not created by the Constitution, but by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from independent sources, "such as state law-rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits." Id. at 577. See also, Darrv. Town ofTelluride, 495 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007). 
The Supreme Court has found that implied contracts for continued employment can 
implicate procedural due process safeguards. See Connellv. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208, 
91 S.Ct. 1772,1773, 29 L.Ed.2d 418; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-602, 92 S.Ct. 
2694, 2699-2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 
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2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). 
The trial court, in the instant case, granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees 
and against Appellant on his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation 
claims because: (1) Appellant received no monetary or other tangible benefits from coaching 
[R. 449], and (2) Appellee Bray's two statements confirming that Appellant would be 
coaching a youth baseball team in the 2007 year did not create an actual legal entitlement to a 
volunteer position in 2007. 
As to the trial court's first point: while there is no dispute that Appellant did not 
receive financial compensation for his volunteer service, there is absolutely no factual basis 
for the contention that Appellant received no other tangible benefit from coaching. In 
making such an assertion, the trial court is engaging in pure, subjective speculation. There 
can be no question that Appellant received many tangible benefits (even if non-monetary in 
nature) by participating as a volunteer coach. Furthermore, the trial court cites no legal 
authority for its suggestion that a tangible benefit must be one of a monetary nature under a 
Fourteenth Amendment "property interest" deprivation analysis. 
As to the trial court's second point: if Bray verbally promised Appellant on two 
different occasions that he would be allowed to coach a baseball team in 2007, then there 
was certainly an implied agreement in place and a reasonable expectation by Appellant that 
he would be coaching in 2007. Appellant's volunteer status does not diminish the fact that 
an express oral contract was formed when Bray made the commitment to Appellant. 
The liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments encompasses an individual's freedom to work and earn a living. If in the 
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course of dismissing an employee, the government takes steps or makes charges that so 
severely stigmatize the employee that she cannot avail herself of other employment 
opportunities, a claim for deprivation of liberty will stand. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 573-
74, 92 S.Ct. at 2707-08. 
Appellant has been seriously burdened in that he has been deprived of the 
opportunity of coaching his son in this setting, the Lehi baseball team; a setting where 
Appellant's roots that go back a generation. 
I. If Appellant did have a liberty and/or property interest in volunteer 
coaching, the trial court's failure to analyze and determine Appellant's 
procedural due process claim was erroneous. 
Because the trial court concluded that Appellant had no liberty or property interests 
in volunteer coaching youth baseball teams, the trial court did not feel obligated to address 
Appellant's claim of procedural due process violations. [R. 448]. If this Court reverses the 
trial court's decision and finds that Appellant did have a liberty or property interest in 
volunteering as a coach, the trial court should be required to address Appellant's claim of 
procedural due process violations. 
J. If the trial court is reversed and Appellant establishes his § 1983 claim, 
an award of attorney's fees under § 1988 could be awarded in the trial 
court's discretion. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) authorizes courts to award attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party in any action or proceeding to enforce provisions of a variety of federally created 
statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Should this Court reverse the trial court's decision as to 
the dismissal of Appellant's § 1983 claim, Appellant would be entitied to renew his request 
for attorney's fees under § 1988(b). 
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3^ The trial court erred granting Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees by 
dismissing Appellant's defamation and breach of contract causes of action on 
the basis that Appellant did not reference such causes of action in his < 
Amended Notice of Claim. 
A. Standard of review. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views "the facts in a 
light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the trial's 
conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Schurt^ v. BMW ofN. 
Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); Blue Cross &Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 119 P.2d 634, 
636-37 (Utah 1989); Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, \ 1, 44 P.3d 704. 
B. Appellant was not required to list specific causes of action in the notice 
of claim in order to preserve those causes of action. 
The trial court dismissed Appellant's causes of action for defamation, breach of 
contract, and equitable estoppel on grounds that Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim fails to 
reference those causes of action in the "Nature of the Claim" section.3 [R. 446-447]. 
In reaching its decision, the trial court indicated that Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
401(3) (a) (ii) requires that "[t]he notice of claim shall set forth... the nature of the claim 
asserted." The trial court also referenced Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT 
App 36, If 9,131 P.3d 275 in acknowledging that the UGIA does not require a listing of 
"each specific cause of action that might be pleaded." 
Nevertheless, in the instant case, the trial court dismissed the three causes of action 
because ".. .no information in the AmendedNotice of Claim apprises Lehi City of its potential 
liability for out-of-the-blue claims such as defamation or breach of contract." [R. 447]. Citing 
3
 Appellant does not appeal the dismissal of the equitable estoppel cause of action. 
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the "strict compliance" language from Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, f 12, 37 
P.3d 1156 and Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, f 14, 155 P.3d 900, the trial 
court found that Appellant's failed to "strictly comply" with the notice requirement because 
there was no information contained in the Amended Notice of Claim that would "apprise" Lehi 
City of possible defamation and/or breach of contract claims. [R. 446-447]. 
On appeal, Appellant asserts that there is direct conflict between the rulings in the 
Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C and Heideman cases and that the ruling in the Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C 
case should apply and the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's defamation and breach of 
contract claims. 
L The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) and relevant case 
law interpreting that section does not require an aggrieved party to list all 
specific causes of action it might have in the notice of claim. 
It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that courts should consider 
the plain meaning of a statute's language. "Under our established rules of statutory 
construction, we look first to the plain meaning of the pertinent language in interpreting [a 
statute]; only if the language is ambiguous do we consider other sources for its meaning." 
Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2006 UT 58, | 9, 147 P.3d 1189. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) requires that a notice of claim contain four 
elements.4 The second required element that a claimant must provide in the notice of claim 
is "the nature of the claim asserted." Importantly, the statutory language does not require a 
4
 The four elements are: (1) a brief statement of the facts; (2) the nature of the claim 
asserted; (3) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and (4) if the 
claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee. 
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claimant to include "all legal claims/' "all causes of action" or any other enumeration of 
specific or particular theories or claims. All that is required is for a claimant to indicate the 
"nature" of the claim. 
It is also significant that the word "claim" is singular. Claimants need not list "claims" 
or "causes of action," but only indicate the nature of the claim. This sort of broad and general 
language is mirrored in the first and third elements required for a notice of claim. The first 
element is a "brief statement of facts and the third element is the damages incurred by the 
claimant "insofar as they are known." Claimants are not required to provide a litany of facts 
or ascertain all potential damages resulting from a governmental entity's (or employee's) 
actions. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that claimants must "strictly comply" 
with the requirements of the UGIA (see Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, Tf 12, 37 
P.3d 1156), this directive does not speak to the matter of how those individual requirements should 
be construed or interpreted. It is a fallacy to argue that broad mandate of "strict compliance" with 
UGIA's requirements somehow means that the words "nature of the claim" require a 
claimant to list all possible causes of actions or claims. What is at issue in this particular case 
is not the broader rule of "strict compliance" but how a claimant can conceivably articulate 
the "nature of the claim" in a notice of claim without categorically listing each cause of 
action. To state that strict compliance is required says nothing about how a claimant strictly 
complies with a particular requirement. 
Unfortunately, the Heideman decision does nothing to provide clarity on the matter; 
and, when read in its plainest terms, appears to contradict the ruling in Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C. 
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In Cedar Prof7Pla^a L.C., the court specifically allowed the plaintiff to maintain a direct 
negligence claim against the defendant city despite the fact that the effective notice of claim 
only contained an allegation of negligent supervision of contractors by the city and not a 
claim of direct negligence. In reaching this decision, the court specifically ruled: "Nothing in 
the Act requires a claimant to set forth in the notice of claim each specific cause of action 
that might be pleaded against the government entity. Rather, the Act requires only that the 
notice of claim include 'a brief statement of the facts/ 'the nature of the claim asserted/ and 
'the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.'" (Internal citations 
omitted). Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C, 2006 UT App 36, % 9. 
In Houghton v. Department of Health 2005 UT 63,121,125 P.3d 860, the Utah Supreme 
Court advised: "Although we have mandated strict compliance with the notice of claim 
procedures, we have not required that such notices 'meet the standards required to state a 
claim for relief.' Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328,111, 100 P.3d 254 (quoting Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983)). Rather, a plaintiff need only 
include 'enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so that the 
defendant can appraise its potential liability.' Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 
1990)." 
The Peeples decision is also instructive. In that case, the court was required to 
determine whether the plaintiff strictly complied with the notice of claim requirements. The 
defendant (the State of Utah) had argued that the plaintiffs one sentence statement of facts 
was insufficient to meet the first element of the notice of claim requirement. In reversing the 
lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim for failure to provide a sufficiently detailed 
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statement of the facts, the court made the following observation: 
Having determined that the Act [the UGIA], while not a model of specific 
clarity, is not ambiguous, our analysis turns to whether Peeples's notice strictly 
complied with the Act. The strict compliance standard favors the State, and its 
application often results in the barring of claims. See, e.g., Gurule, 2003 UT 25 
at Tflf 4-8, 69 P.3d 1287 (barring claim when notice was not properly directed 
to county clerk, even though notice was timely directed to county 
commissioner); Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,H 17> 37 p-3d 1156 
(barring claim when notice was not properly directed to president or secretary 
of UTA board, despite communications with and timely notice to claims 
adjuster); Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App 93,fflj 2, 6-7, 22 P.3d 257 
(barring claim when notice directed to risk management rather than attorney 
general). Strict compliance is not, however, a one-way street, and a claimant is 
not required to do more than the Act clearly requires. Notice need not be 
given to any person other than that directed by statute, even if that person's 
awareness of the claim might facilitate investigation or settlement; notice 
provided exactly one year after an injury arises is just as timely as notice 
comfortably provided six months earlier; and so on. All that is required is 
simple compliance, and there is no need for a claimant to exceed the Act's 
requirements even if such action might more optimally accomplish the 
purposes underlying the Act. Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, Tf 9. 
The Peeples' court then cited the Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 
1179,1183 (Utah 1983) a drew a comparison between the UGIA and the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act to illustrate the quantum of information that should be 
included in a notice of claim. The language is of particular import to Appellant's 
argument in the instant matter: 
Even if we were to view the brevity of Peeples's claim as a defect, 
"defects in the form or content of notices of claim do not always act to 
bar a claim." Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct.App.1994); cf. 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); 
Spencer v. Salt hake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449, 450 (1966) 
(finding sufficient *258 notice of claim despite failure to declare the 
amount of damages as required by statute). We find the supreme 
court's analysis of a similar provision within the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to -17 (2002), to be 
instructive: 
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Defendant also argues that denial of the motion [to amend] was proper 
because the proposed amendment set forth additional allegations and claims 
outside the scope of plaintiffs notice of intent to sue, which had been filed 
prior to commencement of this action. A notice of intent to sue, as required 
by [Utah Code section 78-14-8 (2002) ], is not intended to be the equivalent of 
a complaint and need not contain every allegation and claim set forth in the 
complaint.... Although the notice must include "specific allegations of 
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant," that requirement does 
not need to meet the standards required to state a claim for relief in a 
complaint. The parties need to give only general notice of an intent to sue and 
of the injuries then known and not a statement of legal theories (emphasis 
added). Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1183. 
Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, If 11. 
Finally, the Peeples' court noted: "While the State may desire more information 
than Peeples provided, that desire does not render Peeples's notice insufficient under 
the plain language of the Act. Rather, the State may obtain the desired information 
through formal discovery, informal communications with claimant's counsel, and/or 
its own investigation. Alternatively, the legislature may choose, as it has in the past, to 
require claimants to provide more specific facts in a notice of claim (internal footnote 
and citations omitted). Id. at f^ 12. 
While the statutory element at issue in Peeples was the "brief statement of 
facts" element (rather than the "nature of the claim" element), the position taken by 
the Peeples' court suggesting that a governmental entity may obtain additional desired 
information the formal discovery, investigation, (etc.) is equally applicable to the 
situations where the notice of claim may not contain every legal theory or cause of 
action. The overall 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has established a rule of strict compliance with the 
notice provisions of the UGIA it has also held that: 
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[A] statute is ... to be construed in light of its intended purpose. It is 
necessary to consider the policy of the notice requirement so that in any 
particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if the intent of the 
statute has been accomplished .... The primary purpose of a notice of claim 
requirement is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to 
pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to arrive 
at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of 
public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation (internal citations 
omitted). Stahlv. Utah Transit Auth, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980). 
In summary, Utah courts have indicated that: 
(1) Nothing in the UGIA requires a claimant to set forth in the notice of 
claim each specific cause of action that might be pleaded against the government 
entity. Cedar Prof I Pla^a L. C, 2006 UT App 36, If 9; 
(2) the notice of claim need not meet the standards required to state a claim 
for relief. Houghton, 2005 UT 63, \ 21; 
(3) a claimant is not required to do more than the UGIA clearly requires. 
Peoples, 2004 UT App 328, \ 9; 
(4) [By analogy to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act], parties need to 
give only general notice of an intent to sue and of the injuries then known and not a 
statement of legal theories. Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, ^  11. 
In returning again to the Heideman decision, it is clear that the court in that case 
upheld dismissal of one of the plaintiffs causes of actions for one reason and one reason 
only: the plaintiff had not listed the cause of action in the notice of claim. The 
problem, though, is that Utah courts have explicitly ruled that identifying and listing each 
possible cause of action in the notice of claim is not required. Equally important is the fact 
that the legislature could simply have required claimants to do so by including language to that 
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effect in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii)—but the legislature did not do so. 
As the Peep/es court acknowledged, the UGIA may not be a model of clarity, but it is 
not ambiguous in that a claimant need only state the nature of the claim (and not specific 
causes of actions or legal theories) in order to strictly comply. The Heideman decision resulted 
in an extrapolation of the statutory "nature of the claim" requirement and is tantamount to a 
judicially redefined (and constricted) interpretation of the requirement. No other conclusion 
can be drawn from Heideman than that the failure to specifically name a particular cause of 
action in the "nature of the claim" section results in a claimant forever forfeiting that claim. 
Such a conclusion, however, is squarely at odds with other judicial authority in Utah and 
with the statute itself.5 
Ultimately, the strict "identify every specific cause of action or lose it" standard 
seemingly established by the Heideman decision and the less strict standard articulated in 
Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C, Peep/es (and other cases) creates a "grey area" of ambiguity for 
claimants. Must a claimant really list every potential cause of action/claim/legal theory/basis 
for recovery in order ensure preservation of such for litigation? If not, what level of 
particularity is actually required to set forth the "nature" of the claim? In light of the 
Heideman decision, it appears that there is no clear answer. 
Nevertheless, Appellant argues that a general description identifying the broader legal 
implications of the alleged violation (when read in conjunction with the brief statement of 
5
 The Court may be inclined to "square" the Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C, decision with Heideman 
by rationalizing that the Cedar Prof I Pla^a L.C plaintiff at least mentioned the word 
"negligence" in its third Notice of Claim (even though negligence was never asserted directly 
against the defendant city). Appellant asserts that such a position is still incorrect insofar as it 
would require a claimant to postulate and identify a specific legal theory or general cause of 
action in the notice of claim—something the statute itself does not require. 
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facts and a statement of potential damages) is sufficient to strictly comply with Utah Code 
Ann. §63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii). , 
As argued in the next section, applying the strict Heideman standard can result in the 
unfair forfeiture of legitimate claims that might only become known after the complaint has 
been filed and discovery undertaken. Furthermore, such a strict standard effectively nullifies 
the general provisions allowing for the amendment of pleadings under Utah R. Civ. P. 15. 
\L Requiring a claimant to list specific causes of action in the notice of 
claim defeats the "justice" policy for allowing amended pleadings. 
A narrow interpretation of the "nature of the claim" requirement in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) that requires a claimant to identify all causes of action by name or risk 
losing them wreaks havoc with the established principle that leave to amend pleadings 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Utah courts have 
accepted a liberal interpretation of Rule 15(a) "so as to allow parties to have their claims 
fully adjudicated." Nune^ v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, K 19, 53 P.3d 2. 
Additionally, the general rules of discovery as embodied in Utah's Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26 through 37 contemplate that the process of formal discovery may result in the 
revelation of claims that were initially unknown at the time a complaint was filed or in the 
modification or elimination of other claims. 
If claimants in a suit against a governmental entity are required to state with 
specificity all causes of action in the notice of claim, they will be effectively foreclosed from 
ever amending their pleadings even where a claimant may have been legitimately unaware of 
a specific cause of action at the time the notice of claim was filed, or where such a cause of 
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action is only revealed after litigation discovery has ensued. Such a result is unjust as a 
policy matter and does not accord with the primary purpose of the notice of claim 
requirement. 
"|T]he primary purpose of the notice of claim requirement is to afford the 
responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of 
the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the 
expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." Stahlv. Utah Transit 
Autk, 618 R2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980); see NuneZ v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, f 25. 
Construing the "nature of the claim" requirement to mandate that all conceivable 
causes of action be listed in particularity at the outset in the notice of claim turns Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) into an unreasonable hurdle of exactitude and prescience for a 
claimant. 
Appellant included all causes of actions known to him at the time in his Amended 
Notice of Claim. Moreover, Appellant indicated therein that there may be further causes of 
action discovered during the course of the suit by including the language of "[o]ther 
unknown causes of action." [R. 132]. Appellant also noted in his Amended Notice of Claim 
that Harrison had changed positions in "contradiction to the previous representation" that 
Appellant would be able to assist coaching the basketball team (a claim that could be 
reasonably construed as a breach of contract claim). [R. 132]. 
The Amended'Notice of Claim contains approximately two pages of facts. In the "nature 
of the claim" section, Appellant specifically advised Lehi City that "[t]he following legal 
theories or causes of action may be asserted in whole or in part. The following list is not 
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intended to be a complete summary of all legal theories that may eventually be asserted." [R. 
132]. 
The trial court, notwithstanding, determined that Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim 
was not "sufficiently specific" as to the nature of the claim asserted with respect to the 
subsequent defamation and breach of contract causes of action appearing in the Complaint 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in applying such a rigid standard and that he 
strictly complied with the "nature of the claim" element required by Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-7-401(3)(a)(ii) by providing a description of the broad legal grounds on which he 
would proceed if compelled to file suit. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of the defamation and breach of contract claims 
on grounds that Appellant did not stricdy comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
401(3)(a)(ii). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-state reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's grant of Appellees' Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment on those 
claims outlined herein. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of November 2010. 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN, 
H E I D E M A N , MCKAY, HEUGLY & OLSEN, L.L.C., 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant William A. Doyle 
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H 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
Jessica ANDERSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
O. Lane McCOTTER, in his official capacity as Ex-
ecutive Director of the Utah Department of Correc-
tions; Gary Bortolussi; Katherine Ockey; Betty 
Gaines-Jones; Raymond H. WahL Defendants-Ap-
pellees. 
No. 95-4186. 
Nov, 12, 1996, 
Intern with Utah Department of Corrections sought 
injunctive relief against Department and monetary 
relief against various corrections officials, claiming 
that she was fired in retaliation for exercising her 
First Amendment free speech rights. The United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, Dee 
Benson. J., granted summary judgment for defend-
ants. Intern appealed. The Court of Appeals, Paul J. 
Kelly, Jr.. Circuit Judge, held that: (1) intern was 
entitled to First Amendment protection: (2) material 
fact questions precluded summary judgment: and 
(3) defendants were not entitled to qualified im-
munity. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Government employer can deny benefit of employ-
ment to employee who speaks out against it on mat-
ter of public concern only if it can show that such 
speech adversely affects efficiency or effectiveness 
of its operations, and that government's interest as 
employer outweighs individual employee's interest 
in particular speech. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I. 
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For government employee to support claim that her 
dismissal violated her First Amendment rights, em* 
ployee must show that speech involves matter of 
public concern and not merely issue internal to 
workplace, and that her interest in expression out-
weighs government's interest in promoting effi-
ciency of public services it performs through its 
employees: these are issues for district court, 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I. 
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(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2)) 
If government employee shows that her protected 
speech was substantial or motivating factor in de-
cision to deny her benefit, government then has 
burden to show that it would have reached same de-
cision, absent protected speech; these are questions 
of fact for jury. U.8X.A, Const.Arnend. I. 
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170AXVI! Judgment 
170AXVIKC) Summarv Judgment 
I70AXVH(C)2 ParticularwCases 
170Ak2497 Employees and Employ-
ment Discrimination, Actions Involving 
l70Ak2497.l k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Material fact questions regarding whether employ-
ee's interest in voicing criticism of proposed 
changes in Department of Corrections policy re-
garding sex offenders outweighed Department's in-
terest in enforcing its code of conduct precluded 
summary judgment in employer's § 1983 claim 
against Department alleging that her termination vi-
olated her First Amendment right to free speech. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. I; 42 ^ U.S.C.A. § 1983; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56. 28 U.S.C.A. 
I10| Constitutional Law 92 C=>1933 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XV1II Freedom of Speech, Expression, and 
Press 
92XVflI(P) Public Employees and Officials 
92k 1933 k. Disruption or Interference. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2)) 
Government does not have to wait for public em-
ployee's speech to actually disrupt core operations 
before it takes action, and its reasonable predictions 
of harm used to justify restriction of employee 
speech are entitled to some deference, however, 
government cannot rely on purely speculative alleg-
ations that certain statements caused or will cause 
disruption to justify regulation of employee speech, 
U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. I. 
1111 Civil Rights 78 €=>1376(2) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78k 1376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78k 1376(2) k. Good Faith and Reason-
ableness; Knowledge and Clarity of Law; Motive 
and Intent, in General Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k214(2)) 
Qualified immunity protects government official 
from personal liability and burden of having to go 
to trial unless he violated clearly established stat-
utory or constitutional rights of which reasonable 
person would have known. 
|12| Civil Rights 78 C » 1376(10) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78k 1376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(10) k. Employment Practices. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k214(7)) 
State corrections officials were not entitled to quali-
fied immunity from § 1983 suit brought by employ-
ee who alleged she was fired for speaking out about 
department policies regarding sex offenders, since 
law was clearly established that public employees 
may not be discharged in retaliation for speaking on 
matters of public concern, absent showing that em-
ployer's interest in efficiency of its operations out-
weighed employee's interest in speech. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983. 
*724 Nathan B. Wi!cox,Anderson & Karrenberg, ( 
Ross C, Anderson and Kate A. Toomey with him 
on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-
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Appellant. 
Norman E. Plate. Assistant Utah Attorney General, 
(Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, with him on 
the brief). Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Ap-
pellees. 
Before EBEL, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit 
Judges. 
PAUL KELLY. Jr., Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Jessica Andersen appeals from 
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defend-
ants-Appellees on her civil rights claim under 42 
U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief 
against O. Lane McCotter. in his official capacity 
as Executive Director of the Utah Department of 
Corrections (DOC), and monetary relief against 
various corrections officials, in their individual ca-
pacities, claiming that she was fired from her posi-
tion as an intern with the DOC in retaliation for ex-
ercising her First Amendment rights. Defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). arguing that they were pro-
tected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The 
motion was supported by affidavits, and was there-
fore treated by the district court as a motion for 
summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Apply-
ing the two-step qualified immunity analysis, the 
district court found in the first instance that De-
fendants' actions did not violate Plaintiffs First 
Amendment rights, and thus granted summary judg-
ment. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and reverse. 
*725 Background 
[I] In the summer of 1993, Ms. Andersen, then a 
student at Weber State University, began an intern-
ship with the Utah Board of Pardons. She received 
college credit, and was paid for twenty hours of 
work per week. In September 1993. she was gran-
ted permission by the Board of Pardons to work at 
the Bonneville Community Corrections Center 
(BCCC), a facility managed"by the DOC. Ms. An-
dersen's work at BCCC was credited by the Board 
of Pardons toward the wages it paid her. Until 
March 1994, Ms. Andersen worked as an intern at 
BCCC two nights per week, assisting in a therapy 
program for sex-offenders. 
Early in 1994 the DOC announced proposed 
changes in the sex-offender treatment program. In 
February 1994, Ms, Andersen was interviewed by a 
Salt Lake City television station. During the inter-
view, which was televised on the evening news, she 
criticized the proposed changes, expressing her 
concern that the changes could result in the prema-
ture release of potentially dangerous sex-offenders 
into the community. Ms. Andersen confined her 
comments to expressing her own opinion, and did 
not disclose any confidential information. The next 
day Ms. Andersen was informed that she was being 
terminated because she had said "something negat-
ive about the Department," thus violating official 
DOC policy. The policy prohibited DOC employees 
from speaking to the media without prior authoriza-
tion. 
Ms. Andersen filed suit under § 1983, alleging that 
her criticism of the proposed changes to the sex-
offender treatment program constituted speech on a 
matter of public concern, and was therefore protec-
ted by the First Amendment. She further alleged 
that her exercise of her First Amendment rights was 
the sole motivating factor in her dismissal. Defend-
ants claimed qualified immunity, arguing that Ms, 
Andersen's status as a "volunteer controlled the is-
sue, and that the law was not clearly established 
that volunteers were afforded the same First 
Amendment protection as employees. In the first 
part of the two-part qualified immunity analysis, 
the district court concluded that Ms. Andersen's 
constitutional rights were not violated, and there-
fore did not reach the second step in the qualified 
immunity analysis. See Stegert v. Gillev, 500 U.S. 
226, 232, III S.Ct. 1789/1793, 1.1.4 L.Ed.2d 277 
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(1991): Hinton v. City of Ehvood. Kan.. 997 F.2d 
774. 779-80 (10th Cir.1993). In making this de-
termination, the district court applied the balancing 
test set forth in Pickering v. Dour J of EJuc 391 
U.S. 563. 568. 88 S.Ct. 1731. 1734-35. 20 L.Ed.2d 
811 (1968). weighing Ms. Andersen's interest In 
commenting upon matters of public concern against 
the DOC's interest, as a government employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs. 
On appeal. Ms. Andersen claims that her position 
with the DOC was a valuable governmental benefit 
which could only be denied in a manner that com-
ports with the protections of the First Amendment 
As such, she was entitled to the same protection un-
der Pickering as any public employee. In addition* 
she argues that the district court improperly granted 
summary judgment because it performed the Pick-
ering balancing test without sufficient evidence. 
She also claims that the law was clearly established 
in this area, thereby precluding Defendants' claims 
of qualified immunity. We agree. 
Discussion 
[2] We review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo. Horn v. Squire, 81 F.3d 969, 973 
(10th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When the First 
Amendment is implicated, we are obligated to 
'make an independent examination of the whole re-
cord" in order to ensure that ''the judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression." Melton v. Citv of Oklahoma City, 879 
F.2d 706. 713 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Base Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 
499. 104 S.Ct. 1949. 1958, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984)). 
I. First Amendment Protection 
As an initial matter, we must determine whether 
Ms. Andersen is entitled to the same First Amend-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
Paae5 
ment protections long recognized*726 for public 
employees. Defendants argue that Ms. Andersen 
was simply a volunteer, and as such cannot claim 
she was deprived of a valuable governmental bene-
fit or privilege because (1) she received no remu-
neration from the DOC for her services at BCCC, 
(2) the college credit she received for her internship 
was not necessary for the completion of her degree, 
and (3) the DOC policy manual governing volun-
teers specifically provided that the position could 
be terminated at any time for any reason by either 
party. Essentially, Defendants argue that because 
Ms. Andersen's position could be terminated 4iat 
will," it cannot be viewed as a valuable govern-
mental benefit. We are not persuaded. The uncon-
troverted facts indicate that Ms. Andersen was, for 
all relevant purposes, a public employee. 
[3] Whether Ms. Andersen was a public employee 
or volunteer for purposes of applying the First 
Amendment is a matter of state law. Cf. Jones w 
University of Central Okia. 13 F.3d 361, 364-65 
(10th Cir.1993) (whether an employee has a prop-
em interest in employment for purposes of the 
Fourteenth amendment requires reference to state 
law). Under Utah law, " *an employee is hired and 
paid a salary or wage, works under the direction of 
the employer, and is subject to the employer's con-
trol." " Gourdin ex ret. Close r. Sharon's Cultural 
Educ. Recreational Ass% 845 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 
1992) (quoting Board of Educ. of Alpine Sck DSL 
v. O/sett 684>.2d 49,52 (Utah 1984)). The Utah 
Volunteer Government Workers Act defines a 
"Volunteer" as "any person who donates service 
without pay or other compensation except expenses 
actually and reasonably incurred as approved by the 
supervising agency;* Utah Code Ann. § 67-20-2 
(3)(a) (SuppJ995). Section Cgr06/01.03 of the 
DOCs Adult Probation and Parole Manual defines 
a "Volunteer" as "an individual who provides unco-
erced and uncompensated services, including intern 
services, for the Field Operations Division." 
Aplt.App. at 45. 
Though an intern, Ms. Andersen did not provide 
toOrig. US Gov. Works. 
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uncompensated services: she was paid for twenty 
hours of work per week. The fact that she was paid 
by the Board of Pardons instead of directly by the 
DOC does not alter the source of the pa> ment-the 
State of Utah. The hours Ms, Andersen worked at 
BCCC were credited by the Board f Pardons to-
ward the wages it paid her. She was. in effect. 
loaned by the Board of Pardons to the DOC. Ms. 
Andersen also received college credit for her work 
at BCCC. Whether that particular credit was re-
quired for completion of her degree is a separate 
matter from whether such credit has value. It is un-
controverted that the educational institution granted 
credit for the experience, thereby conferring a non-
monetary benefit upon Ms. Andersen in exchange 
for her continued participation in the State program. 
Ms. Andersen worked under the direction of offi-
cials at BCCC, and was subject to their control. Un-
der the terms of her unsigned agreement with the 
DOC. Ms. Andersen was required to; 
4. attend orientation, on-the-job, and in-service 
training as directed; 
6, follow instructions of paid staff members to 
whom, [she was] responsible; 
8. accept the responsibility of completing assign-
ments and meeting the agreed upon work sched-
ule; and 
9. conduct [herself] with the dignity and assur-
ance of a qualified member of a team performing 
a needed service in a pleasant and efficient man-
ner. 
ApitApp. 52. Although the agreement was entitled 
"Volunteer Agreement," we believe that the proper 
focus must be on analyzing the uncontroverted facts 
about the relationship against a backdrop of state 
employment law, "cutting through the convenient 
labeling of plaintiff as a "volunteer/ " Aplt.App. 
142, Therefore, we conclude that under Utah law, 
and by the terms of the DOCs own policies and 
manuals.,. Ms, Andersen was not a volunteer-she 
was obviously a government employee. 
Finally, the fact that Ms. Andersen's employment 
position was terminable at will does not diminish 
her First Amendment claim. 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has 
made clear that even though a person *727 has no 
"right" to a valuable governmental benefit and 
even though the government may deny him the 
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some 
reasons upon which the government may not rely. 
It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis 
that infringes his constitutionally protected in-
terests-especially, his interest in freedom of 
speech. For if the government could deny a bene-
fit to a person because of his constitutionally pro-
tected speech or associations, his exercise of 
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and 
inhibited, This would allow the government to 
produce a result which [it] could not command 
directly. Such interference with constitutional 
rights is impermissible. 
Perry v. Sindermami 408 U.S. 593. 597. 92 S.Ct. 
2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (citations and 
quotations omitted); see also Rutan v. Republican 
Party, 497 U.S. 62. 72, 110 S.Ct. 2729. 2736, 111 
L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (u[T]he assertion here that the 
employee petitioners ... had no legal entitlement to 
promotion, transfer, or recall [is] beside the 
point."); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 
383-84. 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896-97, 97 L.Ed.2d 3\5 
(1987) (holding that a probationary at-will employ-
ee is entitled to First Amendment protection): Sea-
mons w Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.1996): 
A her cram hie v. OVv of Catoosa, Okhi, 896 F.2d 
1228. 1233 (10th Cir. 19*90). 
[4][5] When acting as a sovereign, the government 
may not, in the absence of justification, restrict an 
individual's right to speak freely on matters of pub-
lic import; nor may the government indirectly exert 
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leverage to suppress speech by unconstitutionally 
tying the receipt of benefits to the speaker's coerced 
silence. We hold that Ms. Andersen's termination 
from her employment position as an intern with the 
DOC because of her public comment on the DOC's 
proposed changes in the sex-offender treatment 
program implicated her First Amendment rights, 
and invoked the protections afforded by the Picker-
ing balancing test. However, even if we accepted 
Defendants' arguments and considered Ms. Ander-
sen a nonpaid volunteer, her claim would not be de-
feated. Defendants argue that volunteers are not en-
titled to First Amendment protection under Picker-
ing. We disagree. The exercise of free speech rights 
is not dependent upon the receipt of a full-time 
salary. "[0]ur modem 'unconstitutional conditions' 
doctrine holds that the government 'may not deny a 
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his con-
stitutionally protected ... freedom of speech*...." 
Board of Cowuv Comm'rs v. Umbelv\ 518 U.S. 
668, — . 116 S.Ct. 2342. 2347. 135 LEd.2d 843 
(1996) (quoting Pern. 408 U.S. at 597. 92 S.Ct. at 
2697). For example, the Court has recognized a 
variety of benefits which cannot be denied solely 
because of the exercise of constitutional rights. See, 
e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72-73, 110 S.Ct. at^2735-36 
(promotion or transfer in a government job); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 
1322, 1327 n. 6, 22 LEd.2d 600 (1969) (welfare 
benefits); Sherbert v. Vemer. 374 U.S. 398, 404-05, 
83 S.Ct. 1790. 1794-95, 10 LEd.2d 965 (1963) 
(unemployment benefits); Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513. 525-26, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341-41 2 
L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (tax exemptions). 
[6] Having concluded that a protectible interest ex-
ists, we must ascertain whether the court properly 
balanced the interests of the institution against 
those of the plaintiff. The district court merely took 
the DOC's written policy and. in essence, concluded 
that because it was in writing it was therefore justi-
fied. A government employer can deny the benefit 
of employment to an employee who speaks out 
against it on a matter of public concern only if it 
can show that such speech adversely affects the ef-
ficiency or effectiveness of its operations, see Pick-
ering, 391 U.S. at 56$. 88 S.Ct. at 1734-35. and 
that the government's interest, as an employer, out-
weighs the individual employee's interest in the 
particular speech, hi It is no different here. If Ms. 
Andersen's speech on a matter of public concern 
sufficiently disrupted the operations of the DOC, 
the benefit of the opportunity to work at BCCC 
may also be denied. Pickering and its progeny 
make no distinctions based on the type of benefit 
received by the individual. Thus, any benefits con-
ferred by government employers may be limited or 
denied on the basis of speech, *728 but only if that 
speech adversely affects the government employer's 
ability to carry out its operations and if the adverse 
effect to the government outweighs the interests of 
the speaker. The government employer must justify 
the denial of benefits by showing that its interest in 
maintaining efficient operations actually outweighs 
the individual's interest in her speech on matters of 
public concern, Since Ms. Andersen was deprived 
of this benefit by a government employer, we must 
apply the Pickering balancing test to determine 
whether this termination violated her First Amend-
ment rights. 
[7] In order for Ms. Andersen to prevail on a claim 
that her dismissal violated her First Amendment 
rights, the court must first determine that her 
speech is constitutionally protected. Horn, $\ F.3d 
at 974: Moore v. City of Wvwmvood, 51 F.3d 924. 
931 (10th Cir.1995). To establish that speech is 
protected, the plaintiff must first show that the 
speech involves a matter of public concern and not 
merelv an issue internal to the workplace. Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138. 146-47. 103 S.Ct. 1684. 
1689-90, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Moore. 57 FJd at 
931. If the speech does involve a matter of public 
concern, the plaintiff must then show that her in-
terest in the expression outweighs the government's 
interest in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees. Picker-
ing 391 U.S. at 568, SS S.Ct. at 1734-35: Comid-
ine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695, 700 
(10th Cir. 1990). In this regard, the "[s]tate bears a 
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burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate 
arounds." Rankik 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 
2899: Connick. 461 U.S. at 150. 103 S.Ct. at 
1691-92: Comidine, 910 F.2d at 700-01. These are 
questions of law for the district court. 
[8J If the balance in the Pickering test tips in favor 
of the plaintiff-meaning the speech in question is 
protected-the plaintiff must then show that the 
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
decision to denv the benefit. ML Healthy City Sch. 
DisL Bd ofEduc. v. Davie. 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 
S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Horn 81 
F.3d at 974. The government then has the burden to 
show that it would have reached the same decision 
in the absence of the protected speech. ML Healthw 
429 U.S. at 287. 97 S.Ct. at 576: Horn, 81 F.3d at 
974. These are questions of fact for the jury. 
The parties agree and the district court found that 
Ms. Andersen's statements criticizing the DOCs 
proposed changes in its sex-offender treatment 
policy did constitute speech on a matter of public 
concern. At issue here is the district court's applica-
tion of the Pickering balancing test. 
[9] The district court granted summary' judgment to 
Defendants because it found that Ms. Andersen's 
interest in voicing her criticism was "clearly out-
weighed" by the DOCs interest in enforcing its 
Code of Conduct. In so deciding, the court found 
(I) that Ms. Andersen's criticisms were 
"unwarranted." (2) that the criticism "undermine[d] 
public confidence'* in the DOC. and (3) that Ms. 
Andersen's noncompliance with DOC policy-
speaking to the public without prior authorization-
"Interfered with the regular operation of the DOC* 
Such conclusions might be proper after balancing 
the interests under Pickering, if they were suppor-
ted by evidence. In this case, however, Defendants 
put forth no evidence to support the district court's 
findings. Instead, they rely solely on statements 
contained in the DOCs Code of Conduct and its 
Community Relations Manual, Section AE 
02/03.01 (O) of the Code of Conduct provides that 
"[njo member shall act or behave privately or offi-
cially in such a manner that undermines the effi-
ciency of the Department, causes the public to lose 
confidence in the Department, or brings discredit 
upon himself, the State of Utah, or the Depart-
ment." ApIt.App. at 33. Section AE 02/03.06 states 
that "[m]embers shall not make critical or disloyal 
public remarks about any policy, procedure, official 
act, or other member of the Department...;* 
ApIt.App. at 35. The Community Relations policy 
expressly states that public criticism "undermines 
public confidence in the DOC" and, therefore, is 
forbidden. ApIt.App. at 37. 
[10] Here, there is no integration of facts with the 
policy statements. It is the governmental defend-
ant's burden to justify the challenged discharge on 
legitimate grounds. *729 Comidine, 910 F.2d at 
700-01. The government does not have to wait for 
speech to actually disrupt core operations before it 
takes any action, and its reasonable predictions of 
harm used to justify restriction of employee speech 
are entitled to some deference. Moore, 57 F.3d at 
934 (china Waters r. Churchill 511 U.S. 661. 673, 
677, 114 S.Ct. 1878. 1837, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) 
). However, **[t]he government cannot rely on 
purely speculative allegations that certain state-
ments caused or will cause disruption to justify the 
regulation of employee speech." Moore, 57 F.3d at 
934; IVuif v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 862 
(10th Cir. 1989). The Pickering balancing test re-
quires a "fact-sensitive" weighing of the govern-
ment's interests. Umhehr, 518 U.S at —-, 116 S.Ct. 
at 2348. Necessarily. Defendants must provide 
evidence sufficient to assess the character and 
weight of the DOCs interests. Comidine, 910 F.2d 
at 701. Defendants provided no such evidence. Ac-
cordingly, at this stage of the proceedings. Defend-
ants are not entitled to summary judgment. 
II, Qualified Immunity 
The district court found that Defendants* actions did 
not violate Ms. Andersen's constitutional rights, and 
therefore did not address whether, in the event of 
such a violation, Defendants would be entitled to 
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qualified immunity. We have concluded, however* 
that the allegations at least implicate a clearly es-
tablished right. Because both panics fully argued 
the issue of qualified immunity before the district 
court and on appeal, and because we find that the 
proper resolution is apparent, we will consider this 
lesal question. See Si.:gleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106. 121. 96 S.Ct. 2868. 2877, 49 L.£d.2d 826 
(1976); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 
1215. 122^ ) (10th Cir.1996); Medina v. Citv and 
County of Denver. 960 F.2d 1493. 1497 (10th 
Cir.1992). 
[I1][I2] Qualified immunity protects a government 
official from personal liability and the burden of 
having to go to trial unless he violated "clearly es-
tablished statutory or constitutional rights of which 
a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, EIS, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 
2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Moore, 51 F.3d at 
931. Defendants argue that even if Ms. Andersen's 
termination violated her First Amendment rights, 
they are entitled to qualified immunity because the 
law was not clearly established in March 1994 that 
a volunteer had the same rights as an employee or 
that one's volunteer status could not be revoked on 
the basis of protected speech. But see Hvland v. 
Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129. 1136 (9th Cir.1992), cert, 
denied 508 U.S. 908. 113 S.Ct. 2337, 124 L.Ed.2d 
248 (1993); Janusaitis v. Middlehutr Volunteer 
Fire Dep'L 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir.1979). We need 
not decide whether it was clearly established before 
this case that volunteers had Pickering protection, 
because Ms. Andersen was not a volunteer. As dis-
cussed above, she was a public employee who was 
paid by the State of Utah, who worked under the 
direction of officials at BCCC and who was subject 
to the control of the DOC. See Gourdin. 845 P.2d at 
244. The law has been clearly established since 
1968 that public employees may not be discharged 
in retaliation for speaking on matters of public con-
cern, absent a showing that the government em-
ployer's interest in the efficiency of its operations 
outweighs the employee's interest in the speech. 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 56S, 88 S.Ct. at 1734-35; 
Rankin. 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899: Horn, 
81 F.3d at 974; Moore, 57 F.3d at 931. Because the 
law in this area was clearly established in March 
1994, Defendants are not entitled to qualified im-
munity. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
C.A. 10 (Utah), 1996. 
Andersen v. McCotter 
100F.3d723, 12 IER Cases 401 
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Chapter 7 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
Section 401 Claim for injury - Notice -- Contents - Service - Legal disability — Appointment of 
guardian ad litem. 
63G-7-401. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal disability - Appointment 
of guardian ad litem. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known: 
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee: and 
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee. 
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant. 
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of the employees duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and 
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in 
Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to 
the office of: 
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a school 
district or board of education; 
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when the claim is against a local district or 
special service district; 
(E) the attorney general when the claim is against the state: 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the claim 
is against any other public board, commission, or body; or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental 
entity under Subsection (5)(e). 
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a governmental entity 
is sustained by a claimant who is under the age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental 
entity may file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential 
claimant. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under Section 63G-7-402 begins 
when the order appointing the guardian is issued. 
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce containing: 
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity; 
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and 
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered. 
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to ensure that the information is 
accurate; 
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a form for governmental 
entities to complete that provides the information required by Subsection (5)(a). 
(d) (i) A newly incorporated municipality shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) 
promptly after the lieutenant governor issues a certificate of incorporation under Section 67-la-6.5. 
(ii) A newly incorporated local district shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the 
time that the written notice is filed with the lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215, 
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept 
notices of claim on its behalf 
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall: 
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section arranged both alphabetically by entity 
and by county of operation; and 
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via hard copy. 
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the grounds that it 
was not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental 
entity's failure to file or update the statement required by Subsection (5). 
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131 P.3d 275, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2006 UT App 36 
(Cite as: 13! P.3d 275) 
c 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
CEDAR PROFESSIONAL PLAZA, L.C, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, Defendant and 
Appellee. 
No. 20040958-CA. 
Feb. 9,2006. 
Background; Following the dismissal, due to fail-
ure to complv with pre-suit notice requirements of 
Governmental Immunity Act. of property owner's 
negligent supervision action against city, which 
sought compensation for damage caused by an ir-
rigation pipe that burst during construction project 
at adjacent city-owned property, owner filed second 
complaint that also included claims for direct negli-
gence based on city's own activities. The Fifth Dis-
trict Court. Cedar City Department. J. Philip Eves. 
J., awarded summary judgment to city. Owner ap-
pealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held 
that: 
(1) trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over first complaint: 
(2) owner was not required to set forth all specific 
causes of action it might assert in the pre-suit notice 
of claim: and 
(3) equitable discovery rule did not toll one-year 
period within which owner was required to file pre-
suit notice of claim. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
111 Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30kS42(l) k. In General Most 
Cited Cases 
Limitation of Actions 241 €=> 199(1) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial and Review 
241 k 199 Questions for Jury 
24lkl99(l) k. In General Most Cited 
The applicability of a statute of limitations and the 
applicability of the discovery rule are questions of 
law, which Court of Appeals reviews for correct-
ness. 
[2] Municipal Corporations 268 €=>845(1) 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(D) Defects or Obstructions in Sew-
ers, Drains, and Water Courses 
268k845 Actions for Injuries 
268k845(l) k. Nature of Remedy and 
Notice or Presentation of Claim, Most Cited Cases 
Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
first complaint filed by property owner against city 
arising out of damage caused by an irrigation pipe 
that burst during construction project on adjacent 
city-owned property, where pre-suit notices of 
claim sent by owner pursuant to the Governmental 
Immunity Act were not sent to city recorder, as re-
quired "by the Act. U.C.A.1953. 63-30-11 
(3)(b)(ii)(A) (Repealed). 
| 3 | Municipal Corporations 268 C=>845(1) 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XI1(D) Defects or Obstructions in Sew-
ers, Drains, and Water Courses 
268k845 Actions for Injuries 
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268k845(l) k. Nature of Remedy and 
Notice or Presentation of Claim. Most Cited Cases 
Property owner that sought to assert claim against 
city for damage to its property caused by an irriga-
tion pipe that burst during construction project on 
adjacent city-owned property was not required to 
set forth, in the pre-suit notice of claim required by 
the Governmental Immunity Act all specific causes 
of action it might assert against city, and thus no-
tice of claim that alleged negligent supervision of 
contractors was sufficient to provide notice of 
claim for direct negligence by city based on its own 
construction activity: notice was required only to 
inform city of the nature of the claim, and addition-
al theories of negligence could be added to the 
complaint by way of amendment. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-11(3 )(a) (Repealed). 
(4) Municipal Corporations 268 C==>741.15 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k74l Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.I5 k. Necessity and Purpose. 
Most Cited Cases 
Purpose of the notice of a claim that is required to 
be served on a governmental entity by the Govern-
mental Immunity Act is to provide the government-
al entity an opportunity to correct the condition that 
caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps 
settle the matter without the expense of litigation. 
U.C.A.1953. 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(Repeaied). 
\5\ Municipal Corporations 268 €^741 .50 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XH(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.50 k. Form and Sufficiency. 
Most Cited Cases 
The notice of claim required to be served on a gov-
ernmental entity by the Governmental Immunity 
Act need not meet the standards required to plead a 
claim for relief, but must include only enough spe-
cificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of 
the claim so that the defendant can appraise its po-
tential liability. U.C.A.1953,' 63-30-11 
(3)(a)(RepeaIed). 
[6J Municipal Corporations 268 C=>741.40(1) 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k74! Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.40 Excuses for and Relief 
from Delay or Failure 
268k741.40(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Attempts to avoid the rigors of the Governmental 
Immunity Act's requirement of notice of claim by 
tactical characterization of a claim are disfavored. 
U.C.A.1953.63-30-11 (Repealed). 
[7J Municipal Corporations 268 €>^845(1) 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(D) Defects or Obstructions in Sew-
ers, Drains, and Water Courses 
268k845 Actions for Injuries 
268k845( 1) k. Nature of Remedy and 
Notice or Presentation of Claim, Most Cited Cases 
Equitable discovery rule did not toll one-year peri-
od within which property owner was required, pur-
suant to Governmental Immunity Act. to file pre-
suit notice of claim against city for damages caused 
by irrigation pipe that burst during construction 
project at adjacent city-owned property, and thus 
such period began to run no later than date owner 
attempted to file notice asserting a claim for negli-
gent supervision of contractors, rather than date 
owner learned city directly participated in construc-
tion: owner knew it had some form of negligence 
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claim against city when it attempted to file notice, 
and owner was not entitled to wait until it knew all 
of the facts. U.C.AJ953. 63-30-13 (Repealed). 
|8 | Limitation of Actions 241 €^>43 
241 Limitation of Actions 
241II Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or De-
fense 
241 k43 k. Causes of Action in General 
Most Cited Cases 
Generally, a statute of limitations is triggered upon 
the happening of the last evmt necessary to com-
plete the cause of action. 
|9 | Limitation of Actions 241 € ^ 1 6 5 
241 Limitation of Actions 
241IV Operation and Effect of Bar by Limita- tion 
24Ik 165 k. Operation as to Rights or Remed-
ies in General. Most Cited Cases 
If the plaintiff does not commence litigation within 
the statutory time limit, the claim is barred. 
1101 Limitation of Actions 241 €>=>95(1) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
241U Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance. Mistake. Trust Fraud, 
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
24lk95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(l) k. In General: What Consti-
tutes Discovery. Most Cited Cases 
Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action 
will neither prevent the running of a statute of lim-
itations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a 
claim within the relevant statutory period. 
|111 Limitation of Actions 241 €^=>95(1) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance. Mistake, Trust, Fraud, 
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
241 k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(l) k. In General; What Consti-
tutes Discovery. Most Cited Cases 
In narrow instances, a statute of limitations may be 
tolled pending the discovery of the facts forming 
the basis of the claim. 
f 12| Limitation of Actions 241 C » 9 5 ( l ) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
241II Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust Fraud, 
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
24 Ik95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241 k95( I) k. In Genera): What Consti-
tutes Discovery. Most Cited Cases 
Under the "equitable discovery rule/* the running 
of a statute of limitations may be tolled: (1) where a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of ac-
tion because of the defendant's concealment or mis-
leading conduct, or (2) where the case presents ex-
ceptional circumstances and the application of the 
general rule would be irrational or unjust, regard-
less of any showing that the defendant has preven-
ted the discovery- of the cause of action. 
*277 Blaine T. Hofeling and Justin W. Wayment, 
Hofeling & Wayment LLP, Cedar City, for Appel-
lant. 
Allan L. Larson and David F. Mull, Snow 
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellee. 
Before BENCH, P.J., DAVIS, and McHUGH, JJ. 
OPINION 
McHUGH, Judge: 
f 1 Cedar Professional Plaza, L.C. (Cedar Profes-
sional) appeals the trial court's dismissal with preju-
dice of its complaint against Cedar City Corpora-
tion (Cedar City) for failure to comply with the no-
tice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act (the Act). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -
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38 (1997 & Supp.2001).FM We affirm. 
FN I. The Utah Legislature amended and 
recodified the Act in 2004. See Utah Code 
Ann. jfg 63-30d-l01 to -904 (2004). The 
injuries alleged to be caused by Cedar City 
occurred before those amendments and are 
governed by the former version of the Act 
See Houghton w Department of Health, 
2005 UTC'63^ 3 n. 2, 125 P.3d 860. There-
fore, all references in this decision are to 
the former version of the Act. 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 On April 30. 2000, a buried irrigation pipe burst 
on property (City Property) owned by Cedar Af-
fordable Housing, an entity of Cedar City Housing 
Authority, which was created by Cedar City. At the 
time of the incident a low-income housing project 
was under construction on the City Property. The 
rupture caused flooding that infiltrated Cedar Pro-
fessional's adjacent property, causing significant 
damage* 
1 3 On June 29. 2000, and September 28. 2000. Ce-
dar Professional sent two separate letters (First No-
tice and Second Notice, respective!}) to Cedar City 
officials in an attempt to comply with the notice 
provisions of the Act. See id §§ 63-30-11, -13. 
Thereafter, on January 8, 2001, Cedar Professional 
filed a complaint against Cedar City and others 
(First Complaint), claiming that Cedar City was li-
able for damages caused by the burst pipe due to its 
negligent supervision of the construction on the 
City Property. 
f 4 Upon motion by Cedar City, the trial court dis-
missed the First Complaint on the grounds that the 
First Notice and Second Notice had not been direc-
ted to the authorized governmental agent identified 
in the Act See id § 63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii)(AX Cedar 
Professional does not challenge the dismissal of the 
First Complaint. Although over a year had passed 
since the flooding, the trial court dismissed Cedar 
Professional's complaint without prejudice. 
*278 f 5 On October 25? 2002, Cedar Professional 
prepared a new notice of claim (Third Notice) and 
delivered it to the proper governmental agent See 
id. Subsequently, on January 10, 2003, Cedar Pro-
fessional filed a new complaint against Cedar City 
(Second Complaint) that included claims for negli-
gent supervision, as well as claims for direct negli-
gence caused by Cedar City's own activities at the 
construction site on the City Property. Cedar City 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the no-
tice of claim had not been filed within one year as 
required by the Act See id. § 63-30-13, The trial 
court agreed and dismissed the Second Complaint 
with prejudice. Cedar Professional appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
fl] *[ 6 The issue before this court is the application 
of the discovery rule to the one-year notice require-
ment in the Act. See id. kThe applicability of a stat-
ute of limitations and the applicability of the dis-
covery rule are questions of law, which we review 
for correctness." Russell Packard Dew, inc. w Car-
son 2005 UT I4,«j 18, 108 P.3d 741 (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[2] f 7 Cedar City is a municipal corporation that 
can be sued only in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act. When a claim is against an incorporated 
city, the Act requires a plaintiff to deliver a notice 
of claim to the city recorder "within one year after 
the claim arises," Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13; see 
id. § 63-30-] l(3)(b)(ii)(A). There is no dispute that 
the First Notice and Second Notice were not de-
livered to the Cedar City recorder. Thus, the trial 
court properly dismissed the First Complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See. e.g., 
Houghton w Department of Health, 2005 UT 63,f 
20, 125 P.3d 860 (providing that strict compliance 
with the notice requirements of the Act is necessary 
to confer subject matter jurisdiction): Gurule v. Salt 
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Pa**e5 
Lake Countw 2003 UT 25.*! 5. 69 P.3d 1287 
(same): Wheeler v. McPherson. 2002 UT \6^ 11. 
40 P.3d 632 (same): Greene v. Utah Transit Audi. 
2001 UT 109.*;*; 15-16. 37 P.3d 1156 (same). 
[3] r 8 On October 25, 2002. after the First Com-
plaint was dismissed. Cedar Professional prepared 
the Third Notice, which it delivered to the Cedar 
City recorder. Although it was delivered to the cor-
rect governmental agent, see Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A). the Third Notice was sent 
well over one year after the April 30, 2000 incident 
that caused the flooding. Cedar Professional argues 
that the Third Notice was timely because it was de-
livered within one >ear of the time Cedar Profes-
sional learned that Cedar City had operated con-
struction equipment on the City Property and was 
allegedly negligent for its own activities, as op-
posed to being negligent in its supervision of other 
parties. We disagree. 
K P ] II 9 Nothing in the Act requires a claimant to 
set forth in the notice of claim each specific cause 
of action that might be pleaded against the govern-
ment enth\\ Rather, the Act requires only that the 
notice of claim include "a brief statement of the 
facts/* "the nature of the claim asserted." and "the 
damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known." Id § 63-30-1 i(3)(aXi)-(iii). "The purpose 
of the notice is to providef ] the governmental en-
tity an opportunity to correct the condition that 
caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps 
settle the matter without the expense of litigation/" 
Houghton. 2005 UT 63 at r 20. 125 P.3d 860 
(alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). The notice need not meet the standards re-
quired to plead a claim for relief, but must include 
only "enough specificity in the notice to inform as 
to the nature of the claim so that the defendant can 
appraise its potential liability.'" Id at <[  21 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
[6] f 10 Thus, the First Notice and Second Notice 
were sufficient to inform Cedar City of the nature 
of the claim so that it could appraise its potential li-
ability. See id. The First Complaint named Cedar 
City as a defendant and asserted negligence claims 
against it. Had Cedar Professional directed the First 
Notice or Second Notice to the correct government-
al agent, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 
(3)(b)(ii)(A), its First Complaint would not have 
been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Upon learning*279 of Cedar City's direct in-
volvement in the construction activities on the City 
Property. Cedar Professional would then have been 
entitled to amend the First Complaint to add addi-
tional negligence theories, even if the statute of 
limitations had run.Fs: It is only because the First 
Notice and Second Notice were ineffective that Ce-
dar Professional attempted to repackage its claims 
arising out of the April 30, 2000 incident as a new 
cause of action. Attempts to avoid the rigors of the 
Act by tactical characterization of a claim are dis-
favored. See Gil (man v. Department of Fin, Insts.. 
782 P.2d 506. 512 (Utah 1989) (rejecting bank-
ruptcy trustee's attempt to cast a claim arising out 
of a regulator's licensing decision as a negligence 
action to avoid the Act): see also Jensen v. IHC 
Hasps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327. 336-37 (Utah 1997) 
(rejecting attempt to avoid medical malpractice 
statute of limitations by characterizing claim as 
fraud). 
FN2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) 
provides that new claims added in an 
amended complaint relate back to the date 
of the original complaint if "the claim ... 
asserted in the amended [complaint] arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth 
in the original [complaint]." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 15(c): see also Gary Porter Consir. v. 
Far Constr.. Inc., 2004 UT App 354,«; 40, 
101 P3d 371 (discussing test for relation 
back under rule 15(c)). cert, denied, 123 
P.3d 815 (Utah 2005). 
[ 7 P P ] [ 1 0 ] 1 II Furthermore. Cedar Professional 
cannot rely on the discovery rule to avoid the ef-
fects of the running of the statutory time in which it 
could file a valid notice of claim. The Act provides 
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that a claim against a governmental entity is barred 
unless a notice of claim is filed "within one year 
after the claim arises.** Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13: 
see also Warren \\ Provo Cin* Corp., 838 PJd 
1125. 1128 (Utah 1092) ("The notice of claim pro-
visions of sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 operate 
as a one-year statute of limitations In cases brought 
against a governmental entity;*). "A claim arises 
when the statute of limitations that would apply if 
the claim were against a private person begins to 
run/* Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(1). General!}', a 
statute of limitations is triggered "upon the happen-
ing of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action/' Russell Packard Dew. Inc. v. Car-
son. 2005 UT I4,r 20. 108 P.3d 741 (quotations 
and citation omitted). If the plaintiff does not com-
mence litigation within the statutory time limit, the 
claim is barred. See id Furthermore. "[m]ere ignor-
ance of the existence of a cause of action will 
neither prevent the running of [a] statute of limita-
tions nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a claim 
within the relevant statutory period.*" Id. 
[11 If 122] If 12 In narrow instances, a statute of limit-
ations may be tolled pending the discovery of the 
facts forming the basis of the claim. See id at *[ 21. 
The Act does not contain an internal statutory' dis-
covery rule. Thus, there are two situations in which 
the running of the one-year notice requirement in 
the Act may be tolled under the "equitable discov-
ery rule'*: 
(I) where a plaintiff does not become aware of 
the cause of action because of the defendant's 
concealment or misleading conduct, and (2) 
where the case presents exceptional circum-
stances and the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the dis-
covery of the cause of action. 
M at f 25 (quotations and citations omitted). Cedar 
Professional concedes that, absent application of 
the equitable discovery rule, the Third Notice is un-
timely. It argues, however, that the one-year notice 
requirement in the Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
Page 6 
60-30-13, did not commence until It discovered Ce-
dar City's direct participation in the construction 
activities on the City' Property that allegedly caused 
the flooding. 
| 13 There is nothing exceptional about the circum-
stances of this case that would satisfy the second 
situation for application of the equitable discovery 
rule, see Carson, 2005 UT 14 at «f 25. 108 P.3d 74 L 
and Cedar Professional does not assert its applica-
tion here. Thus, the Third Notice is timely only if 
Cedar Professional did not become aware of the 
cause of action because of the City's concealment 
or misleading conduct. See id. From the allegations 
contained in the First Complaint and the First No-
tice and Second Notice, it is undisputed that Cedar 
Professional-280 was aware of a negligence claim 
against Cedar City as early as June 29, 2000. Nev-
ertheless. Cedar Professional asserts that the one-
year notice period in the Act. see Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-13. did not commence until it discovered 
facts to support a direct negligence claim against 
Cedar City. We disagree. 
f 14 Cedar Professional was not entitled to wait un-
til it knew all of the facts supporting its negligence 
claim against Cedar City. It is enough that Cedar 
Professional was "aware that the governmental en-
tity's action or inaction ha[d] resulted in some kind 
of harm to its interests.*' Bank One Utah KA, v. 
West,Jordan City, 2002 UT App 2714 12, 54 PJd 
135. Further, this is not a case where the claimant 
was unaware that the governmental entity had 
harmed its interest. See Vincent v. Salt Lake 
County. 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978) (holding 
that the one-year limit under the Act was tolled un-
til the plaintiff learned, despite the defendant's con-
trary representations, that the defendant's storm 
drain was the cause of damage). Whether Cedar 
City had hoped to conceal its potential liability, 
which we do not decide. Cedar Professional knew 
enough to assert that Cedar City's negligence had 
resulted in "some kind of harm to its interests** as of 
the date of the First Notice. Bank One Utah 2002 
UT App 271 at If 12, 54 P.3d 135. The feet that sub-
im to Grig. US Gov. Works. 
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sequently learned information allowed Cedar Pro-
fessional to refine its negligence claim did not toll 
the one-year period during which it was required to 
serve notice upon Cedar City pursuant to the Act. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13; Peterson v. Union 
Puc. R.R. Co.. 79 Utah 213, 8 P.2d 627. 630-31 
(1932) (holding that plaintiffs amended complaint 
was not barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions where the amendment merely expanded on 
plaintiffs negligence theories, and stating that "in a 
tort action an amendment may vary the statement of 
the original complaint as to the manner in which the 
plaintiff was injured or as to the manner of the de-
fendant's breach of duty"). 
CONCLUSION 
f 15 The trial court properly concluded that the dis-
covery rule was inapplicable in this case and that 
Cedar Professional's action was barred by the one-
year notice requirement in the Act See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13. Therefore, we affirm the trial 
court's dismissal with prejudice of Cedar Profes-
sional's complaint. 
1 16 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Presiding Judge and JAMES 2. DAVIS, Judge. 
Utah App.,2006. 
Cedar Professional Plaza. L.C. v. Cedar Citv Corp. 
131 P.3d 275. 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. 2006 UT App 
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155 P.3d 900. 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. 2007 I T App 11 
(Cite as: 155 PJd 900) 
c 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Kent A. HEIDEMAN; Kimball B. Gardner: and 
Birdview Manufacturing Inc., a Utah corporation. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
WASHINGTON CITY, a Utah municipal corpora-
tion; and unknown persons working for or under the 
authority of Washington City, Defendants and Ap-
pellees. 
NO.20050941-CA. 
Jan. 11,2007. 
Background: Developers who had paid water im-
pact fees to city prior to fee increase for prospective 
units sued city for breach of contract, breach of 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of 
civil rights under § 1983. taking without just com-
pensation, due process violations, intentional inter-
ference with prospective economic relations, and 
attorney fees, all regarding the city's refusal to hon-
or fee payments. On competing motions for sum-
mary judgment, the Fifth District Court. St. George 
Department, G. Rand Beacham, J., entered judg-
ment for city. Developers appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood. As-
sociate P. J., held that: 
(1) developers' notice of claim was insufficient to 
support intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations claim; 
(2) developers failed to put alleged disputed facts at 
summary judgment at issue with admissible evid-
ence of such facts; 
(3) water impact fees were not ''permits" to which 
developers could have a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment; 
(4) developers foiled to meet city eligibility require-
ments to honor prepaid water impact fees; 
(5) even if fee were a permit, developers had no 
protected property interest in issuance of water im-
pact fee permit required for due process violation 
claim; 
(6) city employees' acceptance of prepayment of 
water impact fees did not create a contract that ob-
ligated city to honor those fees in the future; 
(7) any contract formed by prepayment of water im-
pact fees was void as against public policy. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[!J Municipal Corporations 268 C=»741.35 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268R74I Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.35 k. Effect of delay or fail-
ure to give. Most Cited Cases 
Failure to strictly comply with the notice of claim 
requirements under the Governmental Immunity 
Act results in a court's lack of jurisdiction. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-11 (Repealed). 
[21 Municipal Corporations 268 €^>74L50 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.50 k. Form and sufficiency. 
Most Cited Cases 
Developers' notice of claim against city alleging 
breach of contract, § 1983 claims, and "other 
causes of action," was insufficient to put city on no-
tice of intentional interference with economic rela-
tions claim developers brought against city in law-
suit. U.C.A.I953, 63-30-1I(3)(a) (Repealed). 
(3J Judgment 228 €=>!85,2(9) 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to prig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
155 PJd 900. 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. 2007 UT App 11 
(Cite as: 155 P J d 900) 
Page 2 
22S Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228k 185.2 Use of Affida\its 
228k 185.2(9) k. Effect of failure to file 
affidavit. Most Cited Cases 
Judgment 228 C=? 185.3(1) 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228k185.3 Evidence and Affidavits in 
Particular Cases 
228k 185.3(1) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Developers who brought various claims against city 
after city refused to honor water impact fees paid 
by developers in anticipation of fee increase for fu-
ture units, failed to put alleged disputed facts at is-
sue in response to city's summary judgment motion, 
given that developers failed to support memor-
andum alleging disputed facts with any admissible 
evidence of the alleged disputed facts. Rules 
Civ.Proc. Rule 7(c)(3)(B). 
|4] Constitutional Law 92 C=>3874(1) 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXV1I Due Process 
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and 
Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3868 Rights, Interests, Benefits, or 
Privileges Involved in General 
92k3874 Property Rights and Interests 
92k3S74(l) k. In general Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k277(1)) 
To prevail on a due process claim that the party was 
deprived of certain property by the city, the party 
must first establish that it has a "protective prop-
erty interest/" which is a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment. U.S.C.A, Const.Amend. 14. 
|5j Constitutional Law 92 €=>4093 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVH(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVH(G)3 Property in General 
92k4091 Zoning anu Land Use 
92k40L33 k. Particular issues and 
applications. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly i'2k278.2(1)) 
Zoning and Planning 414 ©=>1382(4) 
414 Zoning and Planning 
414 VI11 Permits. Certificates, and Approvals 
414VI1KA) In General 
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans: Subdi-
visions 
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements 
414k 13 82(4) k. Fees, bonds and in 
lieu payments. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 414k382.4) 
Developers did not have legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to water impact fee "permits" at reduced rates 
before city's rate increase, as required to show that 
city's failure to honor payment of such fees violated 
developer's due process rights, given that water im-
pact fee was not "permit." but was merely pre-
requisite to obtaining a building permit, and fee 
was a charge by city to regulate new growth and 
development and to provide adequate public facilit-
ies and services. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's 
U.C.A.§ 11-36-102(7Xa). 
[6| Constitutional Law 92 €^>4093 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXV1I Due Process 
92XXV1I(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)3 Propertv in General 
92k409j Zoning arid Land Use 
92k4093 k. Particular issues and 
applications. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k278.2(I)) 
Zoning and Planning 414 0=^1382(4) 
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414 Zoning and Planning 
414VIII Permits. Certificates, and Approvals 
414VHI(A In General 
414k 1379 Maps. Plats, and Plans; Subdi-
visions 
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements 
4l4kl382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in 
lieu pavments. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 414k382.4) 
City did not violate developers' due process rights 
by refusing to honor prepayment of water impact 
fees at reduced rate before fee increase, given that 
city established eligibility for payment under prior 
rate of submitting permit applications within two 
weeks after effective date of fee increase, and de-
velopers failed to submit permit applications within 
the time provided. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
)7j Constitutional Law 92 €=^4093 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXV1I(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)3 Propertv in General 
92k409l Zoning and Land Use 
92k4093 k. Particular issues and 
applications. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k278.2(l)) 
Zoning and Planning 414 €^1382(4 ) 
414 Zoning and Planning 
414VIII Permits. Certificates, and Approvals 
414VIII(A) In General 
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans: Subdi-
visions 
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements 
414k 1382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in 
lieu payments. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 414k382.4) 
Even if city's water impact fee were a permit, de-
velopers did not have legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to receive such permit as required to demon-
strate a protected property interest for claim that 
city violated their due process rights by refusing to 
honor their prepayment of water impact fees prior 
to fee increase, given that there were no established 
rules or guidelines to secure developers a certain 
benefit when they tendered payment for the fees to 
the city. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend, 14; West's U.C.A. 
§ 11-36-101. 
|8 | Contracts 95 C=>9(1) 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter 
95k9{ 1) k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Contracts 95 €^>15 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(B) Parties. Proposals, and Acceptance 
95k 15 k. Necessity of assent. Most Cited 
Cases 
Contracts 95 C=>27 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95k27 k. Implied agreements. Most Cited 
Cases 
An express or implied-in-fact contract results when 
there is a manifestation of mutual assent by words 
or actions or both, which reasonably are inter-
pretable as indicating an intention to make a bar-
gain with certain terms or terms which reasonably 
may be made certain. 
|9J Zoning and Planning 414 € = > 1382(4) 
414 Zoning and Planning 
414VIII Permits, Certificates, and Approvals 
414VIII(A) In General 
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans; Subdi-
visions 
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements 
414k 1382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in 
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lieu pavments. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 414k382.4) 
City employees' acceptance of developers' tender of 
prepayment for water impact fees at prior rate be-
fore increase for prospective units did not create a 
contract that obligated city to honor the pavments 
for a development at some time in the future, given 
that there was no offer to enter into a contract, there 
was no acceptance from any qualified to enter into 
contracts for the city, no communication that indic-
ated any type of meeting of the minds, and city did 
not vote on contract or have one signed by city re-
corder. West's U.C.A. §§ 10-3-506. 10-6-138. 
(10] Zoning and Planning 414 €^1382(4 ) 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4I4V1II Permits, Certificates, and Approvals 
4I4V11I(A) In General 
414k 1379 Maps, Plats, and Plans: Subdi-
visions 
414k 1382 Conditions and Agreements 
4l4k!382(4) k. Fees, bonds and in 
lieu pavments. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 414k382.4) 
Any contract that could have been formed by ac-
ceptance by city employees of developers' prepay-
ment of water impact fees for future development 
in anticipation of fee increase was void as against 
public policy: city's ability to protect health, safety, 
and welfare of the public would be seriously 
hampered if mere acceptance of fee created binding 
obligation on city. 
*9Q2 Justin R, Elswick and Justin D. Heideman, 
Ascione Heideman & McKay. LLC, Provo, for Ap-
pellants. 
Jeffrey N. Starkey and Bryan J. Pattison, Durham 
Jones & Pinegar, St. George, for Appellees. 
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.I, BILLINGS 
and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
Page 4 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
f 1 Kent A. Heideman, Kimball B. Gardner, and 
Birdview Manufacturing, Ine.(coIIectively, 
Plaintiffs) FNI appeal the trial court's grant of sum-
maty judgment in favor of Defendant Washington 
City (the City), claiming the trial court erred in 
concluding that (I) Plaintiffs' notice of claim was 
defective because it failed to name all possible 
causes of action, (2) there were no genuine issues 
of material fact, (3) Plaintiffs did not have a protec-
ted property interest at stake, (4) the City had not 
converted Plaintiffs' property, (5) the City's conduct 
did not amount to an unconstitutional taking, (6) 
the parties had not entered into a contractual rela-
tionship, (7) the City had not breached any con-
tracts with Plaintiffs, and (8) the City had not 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. We affirm. 
FNI. Plaintiff Birdview Manufacturing, 
Inc. was not named as a claimant in 
Plaintiffs' notice of claim, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp.2003), repealed 
by id § 63-3M-401 (2004), and was there-
fore barred from pursuing any claim for in-
tentional interference with economic rela-
tions asainst the City. See Pigs Gun Club, 
Inc. v. ~Sanpete Coimty> 2002 UT 17, f 10, 
42 P.3d 379 ("Each plaintiffs name must 
be on the notice of claim."). 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 On October 23, 2002, the City passed Ordin-
ance Number 2002-13 (the Ordinance), see Wash-
ington City, Utah, Ordinance 2002-13 (Oct 23, 
3002), which increased water impact fees from 
S2284 to S3182 per dwelling unit.1*2 During the 
October 23 hearing at which the Ordinance was 
first discussed. Plaintiff Kent Heideman, a city 
council member and land developer, expressed con-
cern about when the Ordinance would go into ef-
fect. Mr. Heideman argued that the city council 
should give developers, including himself,, "thirty 
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days to get [current projects] wrapped up." Council 
member Roger Bundy stated that the City of St. 
George "had a stampede" when it did as Mr. 
Heideman suggested. When it came time to vote on 
the *903 Ordinance, Mr. Bundy stated that "there 
may be some people that have permits sitting there 
ready to be pulled,*4 and he thought a two-week 
waiting period was necessary/^ The council ulti-
mately voted to approve the Ordinance with a 
November 6, 2002 effective date. 
FN2. Impact fees are sums of money 
"imposed upon development activity as a 
condition of development approval." Utah 
Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a) (Supp.2006). 
Municipalities are authorized to charge 
them under Utah's Impact Fees Act. See id. 
§§ 11-36-101 to -501 (2003 & Supp.2006). 
FN3. The term "pulled" is used to refer to 
a building permit that is ready to be issued. 
% 3 On November 6, 2002, Mr. Heideman tendered 
two checks to the City for a total of Si50,744 and 
requested sixty-six "water impact fee permits" FX4 
at the prior rate of S2284. On the same day. 
Plaintiff Kimball Gardner, on behalf of Birdview 
Manufacturing, Inc., provided the City with a 
$34,230 check and $30 In cash for fifteen water im-
pact fee permits at the $2284 rate. The City's front 
office staff accepted the payments from Mr. 
Heideman and Mr. Gardner and issued receipts in-
dicating thai the payments were for "66 water im-
pact fees" and "15 water impact fees" respectively. 
Both checks were negotiated and deposited into the 
City's financial account. Prior to accepting 
Plaintiffs' payments, the City's front office staff had 
not received any instruction regarding the impact 
fee rate increase, 
FN4, Although Plaintiffs repeatedly refer 
to "permits" throughout their brief, there 
are no permits at issue in this case. An im-
pact fee is a condition precedent to a build-
ing permit, see Utah Code Ann. § 
ll-36-102(7)(a); it is not a 4itax, a special 
assessment a building permit fee, ... or 
other reasonable permit or application 
fee.n&e/d§ U-35-102(7)(b). 
| 4 At the next city council meeting, on November 
13, 2002, the council addressed the fact that there 
was some confusion regarding prepayment of im-
pact fees. Specifically, the council discussed the 
fact that builders usually pay impact fees when 
their building permits are ready for approval, but in 
response to the fee increase, some were paying im-
pact fees early. The city attorney stated that "[t]here 
needs to be clarification to exceptions to early pay-
ment of impact fees put on the agenda for the 
Council to approve." The mayor then stated that the 
city manager would contact those who had prepaid 
and let them know the issue would be on the next 
city council meeting's agenda for purposes of clari-
fication. The next hearing to discuss the impact fees 
was set for December 11, 2002, and public notice 
was promptly posted, 
f 5 At the December 11 hearing, the agenda item, 
"Clarification of the pre-purchasing of fees con-
cerning the increase of the Water Impact Fee that 
was effective November 6, 2002," was addressed 
The council discussed the following issues: the 
City's intent to tie impact fees to specific lots, 
whether the two-week time frame was meant to ac-
commodate building permits that were being pulled 
during the two-week period, and how the City 
would proceed with prepaid impact fees from those 
who were not at the meeting. 
f 6 During the meeting, the city council expressed 
concern that if it accepted all of the prepayments, it 
would simply need to raise the fees again to accom-
modate more growth. The council then allowed 
audience members to comment, at which time Mr. 
Gardner argued that the City should honor his pre-
payments and "stick by [the] contract that [it] made 
when [it] cashed the check." The city attorney re-
sponded that **[b]re[a]ch of contract is not an issue 
because the staff does not have authority to enter 
into a contract." Mr. Heideman requested an exec-
utive session to address his payments to the City; 
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however, his request was not granted. He made no 
additional statements. At the close of the discus-
sion, the mayor announced that "those people who 
have prepaid the impact fees and have not pulled 
their permits have two weeks until December 26 [ ] 
to pull their permits, if they don't meet ... the City's 
criteria then the City will refund their money;' 
Neither Mr. Heideman nor Mr, Gardner submitted 
building permits to the City by the December 26, 
2002 deadline. 
% 7 On January 27. 2003, the City mailed a certified 
letter to Mr. Heideman stating that he was not en-
titled to prepay water impact fees because he failed 
to present the City with a building permit prior to 
the December 26 deadline. The City enclosed a 
check, dated January 2. 2003. for SI50.744. Mr. 
Heideman returned the check on January 30, 2003. 
A similar letter was mailed to Mr. Gardner. 
However, after three failed delivery*904 attempts, 
it was returned to sender, Mr, Heideman claims he 
eventually accepted payment after the City stipu-
lated, at a temporary restraining order (TRO) hear-
ing, that he could preserve his claims for litigation 
despite receiving the refund. However, there is no 
evidence of the stipulation agreement or the TRO 
hearing in the record on appeal. There is also no 
evidence regarding when Mr, Heideman actually 
cashed the City's check.rv' 
FN5. On appeal. Plaintiffs request interest 
for the "almost 6 month period" in which 
the City "wrongfully retained** their funds. 
Plaintiffs specifically request such relief 
for the first time in this appeal. All of their 
pleadings in the trial court sought delivery 
of the "permits." Moreover, Plaintiffs fail 
to provide any evidence documenting for 
how long the City held their funds. There-
fore, we will not address their claim for in-
terest on the funds. See State v. Invin, 924 
P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("It is a 
well-established rule that a defendant who 
fails to bring an issue before the trial court 
is generally barred from raising it for the 
first time on appeal."). 
r
 8 On or about February 4, 2003, Mr. Heideman 
filed a notice of claim with the City.FNb See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp.2003). In the nature of 
claims section. Mr. Heideman listed the following 
claims: breach of contract. " § 1983 claims against 
certain city officials/' and "[o]ther causes of ac-
tion." On or about April 2, 2003. Mr. Heideman 
filed another notice of claim adding Mr. Gardner as 
a claimant. Other than the additional claimant, the 
two notices were identical. 
FN6. After Plaintiffs filed their notice of 
claim, the Utah Legislature repealed the 
Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-0*1 to -38 (1997 & 
Supp.2003) (repealed), and replaced it with 
the Governmental Immunitv Act of Utah, 
see id §§ 63-30d-I01 to -904 (2004). Be-
cause Plaintiffs' notice of claim was filed 
when the Governmental Immunity Act was 
effective, we refer to that version of the le-
gislation. See Cook v. City of Moroni 2005 
UT App 4 0 4 In. I. 107P.3d713. 
*i 9 On March 12, 2003. Plaintiffs filed a complaint 
against the City alleging breach of contract and 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
About six months later. Plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint alleging, in addition to the two previous 
claims, governmental taking without just compens-
ation, conversion, violation of due process, and vi-
olation of appellants' civil rights under chapter 42. 
section 1983 of the United States Code. Eight 
months later. Plaintiffs filed yet another amended 
complaint, this time adding claims for attorney fees 
under section 1988 of the United States code and 
"the private attorney general doctrine." and a claim 
for intentional interference with prospective eco-
nomic relations. 
f 10 After filing the second amended complaint 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The City 
opposed, and filed its own cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment and motion to strike the substantive 
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paragraphs of Mr. Heideman's's affidavit submitted 
in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment, FN~ On October 22. 2004, the trial court 
granted the City's motion for summary judgment 
and denied Plaintiffs'. Plaintiffs filed a motion to 
reconsider, which the court denied. They now ap-
peal. 
FN7. Plaintiffs1 motion was supported with 
citations to the record and Mr. Heideman's 
own sworn affidavit, The trial court struck 
the affidavit as improper. Plaintiffs do not 
appeal that ruling, yet refer to the affidavit 
in their brief. This court will not consider 
the stricken affidavit. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
<| 11 Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting 
the City's cross-motion for summary judgment 
based on its conclusions that (1) Plaintiffs' notice of 
claim was defective because it failed to name all 
possible causes of action, (2) there were no genuine 
issues of material fact, (3) Plaintiffs did not have a 
protected property interest at stake, (4) the City had 
not converted Plaintiffs1 property, (5) the City's 
conduct did not amount to an unconstitutional tak-
ing. (6) the parties had not entered into a contractu-
al relationship. (7) the City had not breached any 
contracts with Plaintiffs, and (8) the City had not 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Summary judgment is only appropriate 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the parties are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Consequently, we 
review the trial court's legal conclusions for cor-
rectness. See *9Q5Jones r. Salt Lake City Corp., 
2003 UT App 355, €\ 7. 78 PJd 988. In doing so, 
"we view the [undisputed] facts in a light most fa-
vorable to the party against which the motion was 
granted.** Anderson \\ Provo Citv Corp., 2005 UT 
5, <[ 10, 108 PJd 701 (alteration in original) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim 
[1] f 12 The trial court held that Plaintiffs' inten-
tional interference claim was jurisdictional^ barred 
because, among other reasons, the notice of claim 
was defective. The Governmental Immunity Act 
(the Act) requires individuals with claims against 
government entities to comply with the notice of 
claim requirements sti forth in Utah Code section 
63-30-11. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997 & 
Supp.2003). Failure to strictly comply with these 
requirements results in a lack of jurisdiction. See 
Gunile v. Salt lake Coumw 2003 UT 25, % 5, 69 
P.3d 1287; Greene v. Utah Transit Autk, 2001 UT 
109.fi[l5-l6,37P.3dll56.FN* 
FN8. Because the notice of claim provision 
is the same in both versions of the Act, see 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-01 to -38 (1997 
and Supp.2003); id §§ 63-30d-101 to -904 
(2004), case law addressing the notice of 
claim requirement under either version 
governs. See Johnson v. Utah Dep't of 
Tramp., 2006 UT 15, «| 12 n. 6, 133 PJd 402. 
[2] | 13 The Act specifically requires the notice of 
claim to include ki(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the 
damages incurred by the claimant so far as thev are 
known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(ai In 
Plaintiffs' notice of claim, they listed three potential 
claims against the City; "Breach of Contract[,] § 
1983 claims against certain city officialsf,] ... and 
[ojther causes of action." Plaintiffs now argue that 
this was sufficient to put the City on notice of an 
intentional interference with economic relations 
claim. They assert that the document, when viewed 
as a whole, "provided Appellees sufficient oppor-
tunity to investigate, discuss and resolve the poten-
tial claim before the parties became locked in a 
lawsuit." This argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
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*f 14 The requirement of strict compliance derives 
from the fact that the ability to sue the government 
is "a statutorily created exception to the Doctrine of 
Sovereign Immunity, Inasmuch as the maintenance 
of such a cause of action derives from such stat-
utory authority, a prerequisite thereto is meeting the 
conditions prescribed in the statute.** Galfegos v. 
MUh\ile City. 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 
1336-37 (1972). Although Plaintiffs cite to cases 
liberally applying the strict compliance require-
ment, those cases predate the Act's 1998 amend-
ment. "As [the supreme court] stated in Gurule [v. 
Salt Lake Counn: 2003 UT 25, 69 P.3d 1287]. we 
have allowed for less than strict compliance [only] 
in cases which depended upon ambiguities in the ... 
Act: ambiguities clarified by the 1998 amend-
ments/ " Davis v. Central Utah Counseling Ctr,, 
2006 UT 52, «! 44, 147 P.3d 390 (third alteration in 
original) (quoting Gurule. 2003 UT 25 at 1 7, 69 
P.3d 1287). Moreover, there is no ambiguity in the 
nature of claim requirement: "There must be 
enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the 
nature of the claim so that the defendant can ap-
praise its potential liability/' Yeaniev v. Jensen, 
798 P,2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). in this case, 
Plaintiffs' notice of claim failed to indicate that they 
intended to pursue an intentional interference with 
economic relations claim. Therefore. Plaintiffs are 
precluded from raising that claim on appeal, ard the 
trial court was correct in concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider it. 
II. Disputed Facts 
| 15 Plaintiffs attempt to raise the issue, for the first 
time on appeal that there was a dispute regarding 
the Ordinance's effective date, thereby making sum-
mary judgment inappropriate. However, they are 
barred from raising this issue on appeal because it 
was not argued below. See State v. Richins, 2004 
UT App 36, f 8, 86 P.3d 759 ("In order to preserve 
an issue for appeal, it ... must be specifically raised 
such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of 
consciousness before the trial court, and must be 
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority/* 
(quotations and citation omitted)). 
*906 [3] <[ 16 More precisely, in the context of 
summary judgment, we are confined to the disputed 
facts that were properly before the trial court. See 
Granite Credit Union v. Remick 2006 UT App 115; 
If 10 n. 4, 133 P.3d 440. In this instance, there are 
no disputed issues of material fact in the record. In 
fact, in their motion for summary judgment, 
Plaintiffs included a lengthy undisputed facts sec-
tion, after which they stated, ,%[T]here are no re-
maining genuine issues as to any material facts/' 
When they responded to the City's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Plaintiffs disputed three facts, but 
did not put any of these facts at issue because they 
failed to support their memorandum with any ad-
missible evidence, as required by rule 7 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(B). Consequently, we do not further address 
Plaintiffs' argument that there were disputed issues 
of material fact.FV* 
FN9. Plaintiffs also argue that there were 
disputed issues of law, and ask this court to 
apply the so-called "complexity analysis" 
from Kennedy v. Silas Mason Ca, 334 
U.S. 249, 256-57, 68 S.Ct 1031, 92 L.Ed 
1347 (1948), to the tacts of this case. 
However, this argument was not presented 
below and therefore will not be considered 
on appeal. See State v. Richins, 2004 UT 
App 36, f 8, 86 R3d 759. 
III. Protected Property Interest 
[4] f 17 Plaintiffs claim that they had a protected 
property interest in the water impact fee ^'permits" 
because they had a 'legitimate claim of entitle-
ment" to them,FNW The Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from depriving its citizens of 
"property without due process of law/' U.S. Const, 
amend. XIV, § I. To prevail on a due process 
claim, a party must first establish that it has a 
"protective property interest/' Hvde Park Co, v. 
Santa Fe City Council, 226 F3d"l207 t 1210 (10th 
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Cir.2000); see also Patterson v. American Fork 
Ciiy. 2003 UT 7. c 23. 61 P.3d 466. This is an in-
terest in which one has ** *a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement/ " Patterson, 2003 UT 7 at r 25, 67 P.3d 
466 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth 408 U.S. 
564. 577. 92 S.Ct. 2701. 33 LEd.2d 548 (1972)), It 
is not "an abstract need for. or [a] unilateral expect-
ation of a benefit." Hyde Park 226 F.3d at 1210. 
Rather, it is a "right to a particular decision reached 
bv apphina rules to facts." Fleurv v. Clayton, 847 
F*2d 123), 1231 (7th Cir. 1988). 
FN 10. In their brief, Plaintiffs state that 
they have a protected property interest in 
%
*the water impact fees on the one hand, on 
in the alternative, in the proper handling of 
[their] funds." The "proper handling 
claim" was not argued below, and there-
fore will not be considered on appeal. See 
Richins. 2004 LT App 36 at«[ 8, 86 P.3d 759. 
| 18 The Tenth Circuit explains that to establish a 
legitimate claim of entitlement, the complaining 
party must "demonstrate that a set of conditions ex-
ist under state and local law, 'the fulfillment of 
which would give rise to a legitimate expectation4 
that the City Council would approve" the plaintiffs 
request. Hyde Park 226 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Jac-
obs, llscomi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 
927 F.2d 1111. 1116 (10th Cir. 1991)). The relevant 
analysis revolves around "whether there is discre-
tion in the defendants to deny [a permit or an action 
requested] by the plaintiffs." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). If there is considerable discretion, 
one is not likely to have a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement. See id. On the other hand, if the City has 
little discretion to deny a permit or request, one 
would be more likely to have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement. See id. Under this standard. Plaintiffs 
do not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to pre-
pay water impact fees. 
(5] f 19 Plaintiffs argue that they had a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to the water impact fee permits 
because the City was obligated to honor their pay-
ments and issue them water impact fee permits. In 
other words, they assert that the City had no discre-
tionary authority to deny them the permits and that 
they therefore had a protected property interest in 
them.FNil However, contrary to Plaintiffs* posi-
tion, a water impact fee is not a "permit" that they 
are entitled to obtain. Instead, a water impact fee is 
a fee imposed as a prerequisite to obtaining a *907 
building permit. See Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102 
(7)(a). More specifically, it is a charge "levied by 
local governments against new development in or-
der to generate revenue for capital funding necessit-
ated by the new development." Salt Lake County v. 
Board of Educ. of Granite Sck DisL, 808 P.2d 
1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added) 
(quotations and citation omitted). One of the 
primary' purposes of impact fees is to "regulate new 
growth and development and provide for adequate 
public facilities and services." Id. at 1058-59. 
Plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled to pay im-
pact fees at a reduced rate prior to having any re-
cognized development projects or pending building 
permit applications circumvents the City's ability to 
manage new growth and development and ad-
equately provide for services needed as a result of 
that growth.FNi: 
FN 11. The City argues that we should not 
address this argument because Plaintiffs 
did not raise the discretionary authority ar-
gument below. However, this is merely an 
extension of the legitimate expectation ar-
gument, which Plaintiffs briefed to the trial 
court. 
FN 12. The Ordinance also specifically 
states that the impact fees "should be 
charged to all new connections to the City's 
culinary water system.** See Washington 
City, Utah, Ordinance 2002-13 (Oct "'23, 
200), and by their own admission, neither 
Mr. Heideman nor Mr. Gardner had any 
development projects ready for connection 
to the City's water system. 
[6] f 20 Also, Plaintiffs could not have had a legit-
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because they did not meet the City's criteria for eli-
gibility. At the December 11 hearing, the Ciry made 
it clear that developers could pay the impact fee at 
the $2284 rate if the developers provided building 
permits to the City by December 26. 2002. Neither 
Mr. Heideman nor Mr. Gardner complied with that 
requirement. Therefore, they were not entitled to 
pay die impact fees at the prior rate. 
c
 21 Plaintiffs argue that the "retroactive applica-
tion of [the] condition precedent to obtaining im-
pact fees at the lower price during the extension 
period** was invalid, yet they offer no legal author-
it) in support of that position. In contrast we find 
convincing the City's position that it was entitled to 
clarify the Ordinance without implicating due pro-
cess concerns. See, e.g.. Foil v. Bullinger. 601 P.2d 
144, 15i (Utah 1979) (finding no error in retroact-
ive application of a law "where the later statute or 
amendment deals only with clarification or ampli-
fication as to how the law should have been under-
stood prior to its enactment.*" (quotations and cita-
tion omitted)). 
[7] | 22 Even if a water impact fee were a permit, 
as Plaintiffs suggest, they would not have been 
automatically entitled to receive one. As the cases 
Plaintiffs cite to in their brief make clear, those 
seeking land-use permits do not have a protected 
property interest in permit approval. See Hvile Park 
Co. w' Sanni Fe Ciiy Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 
1212-13 (10th Cir.2000) (finding no property in-
terest in approval of proposed plat): Patterson v. 
American Fork City. 2003 UT 7, % 24, 67 P.3d 466 
(holding that land developers do '"not typically have 
a claim of entitlement to a favorable [land-use] de-
cision**). Plaintiffs distinguish their case by noting 
that, in contrast to building or zoning permit cases. 
there is no application requirement for water impact 
fees. However, the fact that there is no application 
process hurts, not helps. Plaintiffs' position. See 
Hyde Park 226 F.3d at 1212-13 ("Because the or-
dinances as written contain no standards governing 
the City Council's exercise of discretion, the ordin-
Page 10 
ances simply do not impose 'significant substantive 
restrictions' on the City Council's power of review/* 
(citation omitted)). 
% 23 A legitimate claim of entitlement springs from 
"existing rules and understandings that stem from 
an independent source such as state law-rules or un-
derstandings that secure certain benefits/* Id. at 
1210. As acknowledged in Plaintiffs' brief. "The 
Impact Fees Act[, see Utah Code Ann. §>i 
11-36-101, to -402 (2003).] establishes no 
guidelines about when parties are eligible to pur-
chase impact fees, what parties are eligible to pur-
chase impact fees, etc.** Therefore, there are no 
rules or guidelines that would have secured 
Plaintiffs a certain benefit at the time they tendered 
payment to the City. See Hyde, 226 FJd at 
1212-13. In sum. Plaintiffs fail to establish that 
they had a legitimate claim of entitlement to prepay 
the water impact fees. As a result, several of their 
remaining claims necessarily tail. ,;N-|-; 
FN 13. Without a protected property in-
terest. Plaintiffs' Article I Section 22, tak-
ings claim fails. See Baqfard v. Ephraim 
Ciiy. 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995) 
C*To recover under [AJrtiele L [S]ection 
22. a claimant must possess a protectable 
interest in property that is taken or dam-
aged for a public use."). The same is true 
for their conversion claim. See Fibro 
TrmL Inc. v. Brahman Fin. Inc.. 1999 UT 
13, «I 20, 974 P.2d 288 (requiring current 
possessory right to a chattel as a prerequis-
ite to a conversion claim). 
It is also worth noting that in their mo-
tion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs 
claimed conversion because they had a 
protected property interest in the "water 
impact permits at the time such permits 
were applied for/* and when the City 
failed to give them any permits, it in-
terfered with their existing or potential 
economic relations. On appeal, however, 
they claim that they had a protected in-
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terest in the money paid for the permits. 
As previously noted, because Plaintiffs 
did not raise this second argument before 
the trial court, we will not consider it for 
the first time on appeal. See Richins, 
2004 UT App 36 at % 3, 86 P.3d 759. 
*908 VI, Contractual Relationship 
f 24 Plaintiffs argue that the City entered into a 
contract with them by accepting payment for water 
impact fee permits. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert 
that when they tendered pasment to the City for the 
impact fees, an offer occurred, and when the City's 
front office staff accepted the payments and 
provided a receipt, an acceptance occurred, thereby 
creating an implied-in-fact contract.FN'U 
FN 14. In their reply brief Plaintiffs state 
that an offer occurred when the city coun-
cil voted to extend the deadline to pay wa-
ter impact fees or when they tendered the 
money to the City. Because they are rais-
ing the argument that the City made an of-
fer to them for the first time in their reply 
brief, this court will not consider it. See 
Romrell v. Zions First Natl Bunk, N.A., 
611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah I9S0) ("As a gen-
eral rule, an issue raised in a reply brief 
will not be considered on appeal/'). 
However, even if this court did consider 
the argument raised in Plaintiffs' reply 
brief h would fail because there were 
clearly no certain terms in the City's al-
iened offer. See Rapp v. Suit Lake Citv. 
527 P.2d 651. 654 (Utah 1974). 
[8][9] f 25 An express or implied-in-fact contract 
results when "there is a manifestation of mutual as-
sent, by words or actions or both, which reasonably 
are interpretable as indicating an intention to make 
a bargain with certain terms or terms which reason-
ably may be made certain." Rapp v. Salt Lake Citv, 
527 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1974) (quotations and 
citation omitted). We conclude there was no con-
tract between the parlies in this matter because 
there is no evidence that the necessary elements of 
a contract were present. There was no offer to enter 
into a contract, no acceptance from anyone quali-
fied to enter into contracts for the City, and no 
communication that would indicate any type of 
meetins of the minds. See id; see also Trevino & 
Gonzalez Co. v. RE Midler Co.. 949 S.W.2d 39, 
42 (Tex.App.1997) ("The application for an issu-
ance of a building permit does not constitute a vol-
untary agreement between the parties to enter into 
binding contract/'). 
% 26 There is also no evidence that the City voted 
on a contract with Plaintiffs or had one signed by 
the citv recorder as required bv Utah Code sections 
10-3-506 and 10-6-138. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
10-3-506, 10-6-138 (2003): see also Patterson 
2003 UT 7 at «[ 13. 67 P.3d 466 (finding no binding 
contract with city because city council never voted 
on or approved a binding agreement); Rapp, 527 
P.2d at 654 (requiring statutory formalities 
"[particularly in the case of public contracts"). But 
see Canjietdv. Layum Caw 2005 UT 60. « 17, 122 
P.3d 622 (observing the possibility of an implied 
employment contract with a municipality based on 
** 'the conduct of the parties, announced personnel 
policies, practices of that particular trade or in-
dustry, or other circumstances' " (quoting Beruhe v. 
Fashion Or.. Ltdt 771 P.2d 1033. 1044 (Utah 
1989))). 
[10] % 27 Additionally. Plaintiffs' argument offends 
public policy. As the Colorado Court of Appeals 
held, if the issuance of a permit, or. as is the case 
here, the acceptance of a fee were to create a 
"binding obligation ... the City's ability to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of the public would 
be seriously hampered/* Patzer \\ Citv of Loveland. 
80 P.3d 908. 911 (Colo.Ct.App.2Q03). As a result, 
we do not disturb the trial court's conclusion that no 
contract existed between the parties.FS!5 
FN 15. Because there was no contract, there 
was necessarily no breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. See Buekner 
v. Kennard 2004 UT 78. f 31 ^ 99 P.3d 842 
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("Any claim for breach of contract must be 
predicated on the existence of an express 
or implied contract, in this case a contract 
for employment.")* 
*909 CONCLUSION 
f 28 Plaintiffs fail to identify a protected property 
interest on appeal they have not provided any evid-
ence indicating that there was a contract between 
the parties, and their notice of claim was facially 
insufficient. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment. 
f 29 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS and 
GREGORY K. ORME, Judges. 
Utah App.,2007. 
Heideman v. Washington City 
155 PJd 900. 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2007 UT App 
II 
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statement of the facts in mandatory notice of claim 
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Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
% i The trial court dismissed Delone Peeples's com-
plaint for failure to strictly complj with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (Act), which requires 
claimants to present a "brief statement of the faces'* 
in their mandatory notice of claim. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11 (3)(a)("i) (1997). FNI We reverse and re-
mand. 
FN1. Effective July I, 2004, the relevant 
provision was reenacted as Utah Code sec-
tion 63-30d-401 (3)(a)(i). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND *« 
FN2. "When determining whether a trial 
court properly dismissed a complaint, we 
accept the factual allegations in the com-
plaint as true and consider them, and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
them, in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party." Wood v. University of 
Utah Med Or,. 2002 UT 134,1 ^ 61 P.3d 
436, cert denied, 540 LLS. 946, 124 S.Ct. 
388. 157 LEd.2d 276 (2003). wWe recite 
the facts accordingly." hi 
[I] f 2 On December 5, 2001, Peeples slipped and 
fell on an icy sidewalk in front of the Utah State Li-
quor Store located at 1863 East 7000 South in Salt 
Lake City, injuring her hip. Peeples's attorneys first 
informed the Utah State Risk Management Depart-
ment (the Department) of Peeples's accident by let-
ter dated March 12, 2002, This initial letter identi-
fied Peeples, stated the date and alleged cause of 
the accident, asserted that Peeples had suffered 
multiple injuries, and identified by address the li-
quor store where the accident occurred. The letter 
also requested*256 information regarding insurance 
coverage. 
f 3 On June 17, 2002, Peeples's attorneys sent the 
Department another letter describing Peeples's 
background and injuries in greater detail, along 
with other reports and information related to the ac-
cident. This letter also identified Peeples and the 
date of the accident, but referred to the location of 
the accident solely as "the Utah State Liquor 
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Store." An ambulance report that appears to have 
been enclosed with this letter indicates that Peeples 
was transported by ambulance from 1864 East Fort 
Union, an address very near the liquor store identi-
fied in the March 12 letter. 
f 4 On September 18. 2002, Peeples filed a notice 
of claim with the Utah Attorney General pursuant 
to the Act. Peeples's notice of claim contained the 
following statement of the facts and circumstances 
of her accident: "On December 5. 2001, Ms. 
Peeples fell In front of a Utah State Liquor Store on 
ice. which was allowed to accumulate on the side-
walk, from a poorly designed rain gutter that drains 
onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than underneath 
it" The notice of claim did not identify the liquor 
store by address or otherwise. 
f 5 Peeples brought suit against the property owner 
and the State. The State moved to dismiss Peeples's 
claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, alleging that she failed to strictly 
comply with the Act's requirement that her notice 
of claim include a "brief statement of the facts." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(a)(i) (1997). The tri-
al court concluded that, in a slip and fall case, the 
brief statement of the facts required by the Act 
"must identify the location of the accident." Not-
withstanding the prior communications between 
Peeples's counsel and the Department, the trial 
court concluded that because Peeples's notice of 
claim failed to provide the address where her acci-
dent occurred, Peeples failed to comply with the 
"brief statement of the facts" provision of the Act. 
Id The trial court subsequently dismissed the State 
from Peeples's law suit. Peeples appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[2] f 6 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial 
court properly dismissed Peeples's complaint for 
failure to comply with the Act's notice of claim pro-
visions. "Compliance with the ... Act is a prerequis-
ite to vesting a district court with subject matter jur-
isdiction over claims against governmental entities. 
Accordingly, a district court's dismissal of a case 
based [on the Act] is a determination of law that we 
afford no deferencefand review] for correctness.** 
Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT I6,*f 9, 40 PJd 
632 (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
% 1 The Act requires that a notice of claim "shall set 
forth: (i) a brief statement of the facts; (ii) the 
nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages 
incurred by the claimant so far as the\ are known." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(iV(iii) (1997). 
Decisions of this court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have uniformly held that claimants must strictly 
comply with the Act's notice provisions. See, e.g.. 
Guritle v. Salt Lake Countw 2003 UT 25.1 5. 69 
PJd 1287; Nunez v. Albo. 2002 UT App 247tJ 21. 
53 P.3d 2, cert, denied 59 PJd 603 (Utah 2002). 
"The only authority for allowing less than strict 
compliance is found in cases which depended upon 
ambiguities in the Act." Gurule, 2003 UT 25 at f" 7, 
69 PJd 1287: see, e.g., Larson v. Park Citv Mun. 
Corp., 955 PJd 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998) (allowing 
claim where statute was unclear as to where notice 
was to be filed). 
P][4][5] % 8 "When faced with a question of stat-
utory construction ... this court first looks to the 
plain language of the statute/' In re Estate of Flake, 
2003 i f 17.*: 25, 71 PJd 589. "In construing a 
statute, we assume that 'each term in the statute 
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are 
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable/ '* Id. (quoting Savage In-
dus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 PJd 664, 
670 (Utah 1991)). We find no ambiguity in the 
Act's "brief statement of the facts" provision and 
conclude that the plain language of that provision 
*257 does not require specifics. IN3 While specific 
information might well be helpful, it would not be 
appropriate for this court to "improve" the statute 
by reading an additional element into the legislat-
ively mandated notice requirements. Pursuant to 
statute, a claimant complies merely by providing a 
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brief statement of facts about the claim being made. 
FN3. "A statute is not ambiguous merely 
because the parties disagree about its 
meaning." State v. Beason. 2000 UT App 
109.*; 19. 2 P.3d 459. Rather, - * "[a] stat-
ute is ambiguous [only] if it can be under-
stood by reasonably well-informed persons 
to have different meanings." * v hi (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Derbidge v. 
Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 
791 (Utah Ct.App.i998)) (other citation 
omitted). Our conclusion that the statutory 
language is unambiguous renders irrelev-
ant any dispute over whether Peeples's no-
tice satisfied the legislative intent of the 
Act. See State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843. 845 
{Utah 1992) (*To determine [what] the le-
gislature intended ... we begin with the 
statutes' plain language. We will resort to 
other methods of statutory interpretation 
only if we find the language of the statutes 
to be ambiguous/'), overruled in part on 
other grounds bv State v. Casew 2003 UT 
55,82P.3d 1106'. 
[6][7][8][9] % 9 Having determined that the Act 
while not a model of specific clarity, is not ambigu-
ous, our analysis turns to whether Peeples's notice 
strictly complied with the Act. The strict compli-
ance standard favors the State, and its application 
often results in the barring of claims. See. e.g., 
Gunite, 2003 UT 25 at f( 4-8. 69 P.3d 1287 
(barring claim when notice was not properly direc-
ted to county clerk, even though notice was timely 
directed to county commissioner); Greene v. Utah 
Transit Atttk, 2001 UT 109,5 17, 37 P.3d 1156 
(barring claim when notice was not properly direc-
ted to president or secretary of UTA board, despite 
communications with and timely notice to claims 
adjuster): Thimmes w Utah State Univ.. 2001 UT 
App 93.°; 2, 6-7. 22 P.3d 257 (barring claim when 
notice directed to risk management rather than at-
torney general). Strict compliance is not, however, 
a one-way street, and a claimant is not required to 
do more than the Act clearly requires. Notice need 
not be given to any person other than that directed 
by statute, even if that person's awareness of the 
claim might facilitate investigation or settlement; 
notice provided exactly one year after an injury 
arises is just as timely as notice comfortably 
provided six months earlier; and so on. All that is 
required is simple compliance, and there is no need 
for a claimant to exceed the Act's requirements 
even if such action might more optimally accom-
plish the purposes underlying the Act. 
[10] f 10 In this case. Peeples's notice does strictly 
comply with the Act's requirements. The relevant 
sentence from Peeples's notice of claim states that 
'*[o]n December 5. 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front 
of a Utah State Liquor Store on ice. which was al-
lowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly-
designed rain gutter that drains onto the top of the 
sidewalk, rather than underneath it." By definition, 
this is a statement. It contains multiple facts, in-
cluding the date of Peeples's injury, its alleged 
cause, details of the alleged property defect, and 
that the injury occurred at a Utah State Liquor 
Store. Finally, as complained of by the State, it is 
undeniably brief. FN'4 Peeples's satisfaction of 
these factors complies with the "brief statement of 
the facts" requirement of the Act.FV* 
FN4. Judge Jackson's concurring opinion 
would find a point at which a "brief state-
ment of the facts" can be too brief. This 
author does not find that issue to be before 
the court today, and accordingly refrains 
from joining in Judge Jackson's otherwise 
thoughtful concurrence. 
FN5. We are not unaware of the potential 
for mischief that our literal interpretation 
of the Act's language may present. As a 
practical matter, however, claimants have 
an interest in providing sufficient facts to 
move their claims forward and avoid litiga-
tion over the adequacy of their notice. 
There is no evidence in this case that the 
omission of the location of Peeples's acci-
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dent was a significant impediment to the 
State obtaining adequate information con-
cerning the claim or acting upon it. 
[II] *J II Even if we were to view the brevity of 
Peeples's claim as a defect "defects in the form or 
content of notices of claim do not always act to bar 
a claim:* Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666. 669 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994): cf. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hasp.. 
Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179. 1183 {Utah 1983); Spencer v. 
Salt Lake City. 17 Utah 2d }62. 412 P.2d 449. 450 
(1966) (finding sufficient *258 notice of claim des-
pite failure to declare the amount of damages as re-
quired by statute). We find the supreme court's ana-
lysis of a similar provision within the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act see Utah Coda Ann. §§ 
78-14-1 to -17 (2002), to be instructive: 
Defendant also argues that denial of the motion 
[to amend] was proper because the proposed 
amendment set forth additional allegations and 
claims outside the scope of plaintiffs notice of 
intent to sue, which had been filed prior to com-
mencement of this action. A notice of intent to 
sue. as required by [Utah Code section 78-14-8 
(2002) ], is not intended to be the equivalent of a 
complaint and need not contain every allegation 
and claim set forth in the complaint.... Although 
the notice must include "specific allegations of 
misconduct on the part of the prospective defend-
ant/* that requirement does not need to meet the 
standards required to state a claim for relief in a 
complaint. The parties need to give only general 
notice of an intent to sue and of the injuries then 
known and not a statement of legal theories. 
Behrem, 675 P.2d at 1183, In our view, the Act's 
"brief statement of the facts" requirement is no 
more stringent than the "specific allegations of mis-
conduct" requirement addressed in Behrem. As 
such, factual notice under the Act need not "meet 
the standards required to state a claim for relief/' 
and factual defects in the notice will not bar a claim 
so long as the claim gives "general notice of an in-
tent to $m." hi 
% 12 While the State may desire more information 
than Peepies provided, that desire does not render 
Peeples's notice insufficient under the plain lan-
guage of the Act. Rather, the State may obtain the 
desired information through formal discover), in-
formal communications with claimant's counsel, 
and/or its own investigation/^ Alternatively, the 
legislature may choose, as it has in the past, to re-
quire claimants to provide more specific facts in a 
notice of claim. See, e.g.. Sweet v. Suit Lake GVv. 
43 Utah 306. 134 P. 1167. 1169 (1913) (discussing 
prior version of the Act requiring, in certain claims, 
notice "stating the particular time at which the in-
jury happened, and designating and describing the 
particular place in which it occurred, and also par-
ticularly describing the cause and circumstances of 
the said injury or damages " (emphasis in origin-
a»). 
FN6. In this case, the State had actual 
knowledge of the location of Peeples's ac-
cident from prior correspondence with 
Peeples's attorneys. 
«f 13 Because the Act's "brief statement of the facts" 
requirement is unambiguous. Peeples's notice of 
claim was required to provide such a statement, no 
more and no less. Peeples's notice contained a brief 
statement of facts about her alleged accident and in-
jury. Therefore, her notice strictly complied with 
the Act's requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
f 14 The trial court incorrectly ruled that Peeples's 
notice of claim did not strictly comply with Utah 
Code section 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i). We reverse and re-
mand to the trial court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
f 15 I concur in the opinion but write separately to 
lay out my methodology for understanding what the 
broad "brief statement of the facts" demands of 
claimants. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(a)(i) 
(1997) repealed and reenacted as § 63-30d-401 
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(Supp.2004). Starting with the plain language of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), the 
pivotal term "brief* indicates that the claimant need 
not recite in comprehensive detail all of the facts 
pertaining to the claim. Thus. I conclude that the re-
quirement is not an exacting one and that the State 
has no reasonable expectation that a claimant's no-
tice will satisfy every informational need. 
«[ \6 The analysis could end here, but this case 
raises a further question: Even if the State cannot 
expect to have all of the details, is there a point at 
which a claimant's statement of the facts is so 
devoid of information as to be insufficient? In other 
words, can a claimant's "brief statement of the 
facts" be, *259 in fact too brief? I agree with Judge 
Thome that a claimant's statement of the facts 
should not be faulted for brevity, but, in my view, 
there is a point-albeit a considerably low one-at 
which a statement of the facts can be overly brief. 
f 17 The point at which a brief statement of the 
facts becomes insufficient is defined in part by the 
purposes of the Act. Although we focus on the " 
'plain language/ M we also "recognizfe] that 'our 
primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's in-
tent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve/" Dowling v. Bullen. 2004 UT 504 8, 94 
P.3d 915 (quoting Evans v. State. 963 P.2d 177, 
184 (Utah 1998)). Accordingly. 1 agree with the 
dissent that the notice required by the Act seeks to 
achieve the dual purposes of (1) affording the State 
with an opportunity to investigate and expeditiously 
settle the case and (2) allowing the State to correct 
dangerous conditions. See, e.g.. Wills v. Heher Val-
ley^Hhioric R.R. Audi. 2003 UT 45,5 6, 79 P.3d 
934; Larson v. Park City Mim. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 
345-46 (Utah 1998). 
f 18 However, in assessing the statutory methods 
by which these purposes are to be achieved, I de-
termine that the brief statement of the facts plays 
only a minor role. Of course, in emphasizing the 
notice's reduced role I do not mean to diminish the 
claimant's responsibility to provide timely and ac-
curate information. Nonetheless, it seems almost 
axiomatic to me that a "brief statement of the facts" 
was not intended to act as the primary vehicle for 
the State's investigation and remedial efforts. 
f 19 Ideally, the "brief statement of the tacts" 
should be informative and useful. A circumspect 
claimant would probably include the address of an 
accident. However, based on my understanding of 
the notice requirement's limited role, I conclude 
that a notice's brief statement of the facts is suffi-
cient, at a minimum, when it both identifies the 
claimants and the general facts establishing the 
claim.FNI Such information is enough to meet the 
notice's primary goal in the statutory scheme: to 
warn the State that a particular plaintiff now plans 
to assert a particular claim and that all prior and 
subsequent information provided by the claimant 
should be collected, organized, and investigated. 
FNI. I emphasize "'general** facts because 
it is only natural that the level of detail re-
quired in a notice supported by a "brief 
statement of the facts" ought to be less 
stringent than that required by a formal 
pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) 
(requiring pleadings to contain a "short 
and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief*). Be-
cause our notice-pleading requirements are 
aireadv minimal, see Guardian Title Co. v. 
Mitchell 2002 UT 63,«f 15 n. 4, 54 P.3d 
130 (%i[A]ll that is required is that the 
pleadings be sufficient to give fair notice 
of the nature and basis of the claim asser-
ted and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved.**) (citation and quota-
tion omitted), the notice required by sec-
tion 63-30-11 should demand even less 
factual detail. 
f 20 I disagree with the dissent's position that the 
sufficiency of a claimant's notice with regard to 
these purposes should become a matter of fact-
intensive inquiry. Although the "brief statement of 
the facts*' requirement invites judicial fact-
weighing in this case, I am concerned that such an 
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approach may prove wasteful and ultimately unfair. 
A fact-intensive analysis would undermine judicial 
economy since the sufficiency of even "brief state-
ment of the facts" would fall into question. More 
importantly, it also places an unfair burden on 
claimants to intuit what information a particular 
State entity may or may not require to expeditiously 
investigate and repair a particular incident. For ex-
ample, would it be sufficient for a claimant injured 
on the grounds of the state capitol to include the ad-
dress of the capitol or would the State require more 
precise information? Such high stakes should not be 
attached to a citizen's relatively unimportant de-
termination of which details to include in the "brief 
statement of the facts" and which to include in 
more co?nprehensive filings. 
f 21 In the present case, the State had sufficient in-
formation to investigate the claim because Peeples 
identified herself and the facts underlying her 
claim. Also, prior to the notice, she provided in-
formation indicating the location of the accident 
and therefore she was not required to restate the in-
formation in her brief statement of the facts. 
f 22 Accordingly, I concur in the opinion. 
*260 DAVIS, Judge (dissenting): 
f 23 1 dissent. I agree that the Act requires that a 
notice of claim "shall set forth ... (i) a brief state-
ment of the tacts: (ii) the nature of the claim asser-
ted: and (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant 
so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-1 !(3Xa)(i)-(iii) (Supp.2003). The notice of 
claim provision, as well as other provisions under 
the Act. requires strict compliance by claimants. 
See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16,1 13, 40 
P.3d 632 n j j h e ... Act demands strict compliance 
with its requirements to allow suit against govern-
mental entities. The notice of claim provision, par-
ticularly, neither contemplates nor allows for any-
thing less/*). If a complaint does not strictly comply 
with the requirements of the Act, plaintiffs cannot 
brim* suit ''against the [SJtate or its subdivisions/* 
Id atf II. 
Page 8 
f 24 While a notice of claim is required to 
"provide[ ] the entity being sued with the factual 
details of the incident that led to the plaintiffs 
claim," Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1909 UT 36,c 
20. 977 P.2d 1201, the Act does not further define 
what constitutes a sufficient "brief statement of the 
facts/' Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i). 
However, Utah caselaw has established two pur-
poses of the notice of claim. "[T]he purposefs] of 
such notice of claim [are] to provide the govern-
mental entity an opportunity to [ (I) ] correct the 
condition that caused the injury.[and (2) ] evaluate 
the claim, and perhap: settle the matter without the 
expense of litigation/* Larson v. Park City Mun. 
Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998)>» "In 
deciding how to file a notice of claim upon [the 
State] to satisfy the Act, a claimant has no other 
choice but to rely upon the statutes and upon the 
purpose of the notice statute .../* Id at 346 
(emphasis added). 
FN I. Notwithstanding the lead opinion's 
assertion to the contrary, our supreme 
court has already "improved" the Act. See 
Larson v. Park Cirv Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 
343. 345-46 (Utah 1998). 
% 25 Based upon the plain language of the Act, see 
Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n., 2004 UT 1 U«j 17, 84 P.3d 1197 ('• 4When 
interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's 
meaning by first looking to the statute's plain lan-
guage, and give effect to the plain language unless 
the language is ambiguous/ ** (citation omitted)): 
LovemIahl\\ Jordan Sell DisL. 2002 UT I30,«[ 21, 
63 P.3d 705 (same), Plaintiffs notice of claim con-
stituted a "brief statement of the facts/* Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-1 !(3)(a)(i). Plaintiffs notice of claim 
read, in relevant part, 
On December 55 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front 
of a Utah State Liquor Store on ice, which was 
allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a 
poorly designed rain gutter that drains onto the 
top of the sidewalk, rather than underneath it. 
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Whether the brief statement of the facts in a notice 
of claim addresses the purposes underlying the no-
tice requirement is, however, fact dependent-a point 
conceded by the State in its brief as follows: 
The phrase aa brief statement of facts" is not stat-
utorily defined. That is because section 63-30-11, 
by definition, applies to any claim asserted 
against the State and so it must be general enough 
to apply to all mariner of claims-slip[-]and[-]fall 
claims such as this case, as well as cases that 
arise out of very different circumstances. Thus, 
section 63-30-1 l(3)(a) must be generally worded 
in order to fulfill the purposes of the Act in any 
caseJ|p:i 
FN2. At oral argument counsel for the 
State agreed that respecting certain claims, 
such as defamation, location would be ir-
relevant. It is undisputed, however, that 
location is relevant to the purposes of cor-
recting the condition and evaluating the 
claim in this case. 
Reiving on Pigs Gun Club, Inc v. Sanpete County, 
2002 UT I7 / f 10, 42 P.3d 379. and Rmhton v. Salt 
Lake County, 1999 UT 36,f 20, 977 P.2d 1201, 
however, the trial court ruled as a matter of law 
that, in effect, the notice document must contain 
both the notice requirements in the Act and the pur-
poses of the notice statute. This notwithstanding, 
the State was well aware of which Utah State Li-
quor Store was the subject of Plaintiffs claim and 
thereby in a position to (I) "correct the condition 
that caused the injury/" and (2) "evaluate the claim, 
and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of 
litigation/' *26i Larson 955 P.2d at 345-46.FN3 
Neither of the cases relied upon by the trial court, 
nor any of the other so-called actual notice cases, 
address what constitutes a "brief statement of the 
facts." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(a)(i); see 
Gurule v. Salt Lake County 2003 UT 25,«j 5, 69 
P.3d 1287 (concluding that actual notice by a muni-
cipality of a potential claim does not lower the 
strict compliance standard for filing a notice of 
claim, but not addressing whether the notice com-
plied with the brief statement of the facts require-
ment). Although the focus of Larson is upon the de-
termination of what constitutes the "governing 
body" for the purpose of filing a notice of claim, 
Larson is nonetheless instructive. Larson 955 P.2d 
at 345 (quotations and citation omitted). The Lar-
son court, having reiterated the purposes set out in 
Stahi v. Utah Transit Authority 618 P,2d 480. 482 
(Utah 1980). and having declared that "a claimant 
has no other choice but to rely upon the statutes and 
upon the purpose of the notice statute ** engaged in 
a purpose-based, fact-intensive analysis to determ-
ine which government official is "reasonably and 
logically" the proper person to receive the filing. 
FM
 Larson, 955 P.2d at 346 (emphasis added). 
FN3. f fail to see the point of the lead 
opinion's analysis of irrelevant strict com-
pliance cases and observation that i4[t]he 
strict compliance standard favors the State/' 
FN4. A point counsel for the State refused 
to concede at oral argument, asserting that 
some critical person at the State may not 
have had actual knowledge of the location 
and needed to rely solely on the notice. 
f 26 Whether the purposes of the notice of claim 
are addressed in any given case is contextual and 
requires a fact inquiry. "Purpose" is defined as 
"[a]n objective, goal or end/' Black's Law Diction-
ary 1250 (7th ed.1999), "something set up as an ob-
ject or end to be attained," or "an action in course 
of execution/' Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 
957 (9th ed/1986). Thus, the concept of ^purpose" 
is inherently prospective in nature. A notice of 
claim that must be relied upon for the recipient to 
appropriately and prospectively respond would 
have to contain sufficient information to guide the 
response. It is absurd, however, having complied 
with the plain language of the statute, to require a 
notice of claim to contain information already ob-
tained to accomplish the purpose of providing an 
opportunity to correct, evaluate, and perhaps settle-
a purpose that has already been accomplished and. 
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therefore, is no longer a purpose, 
€\ 27 Therefore. 1 conclude that when determining 
whether a notice of claim contains a sufficient 
"brief statement of the facts/' Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-1 i(3)(a)(iX a trial court must when neces-
sary, make a fact inquiry to determine if the pur-
poses of (I) correcting the condition that caused the 
injun, and (2) evaluating a claim, and possibly set-
tling the claim without litigation have been satis-
fied. r v See Larson. 955 P.2d at 345-46. Since the 
State has refused to concede satisfaction of the pur-
pose requirements in this case, it should have an 
opportunity to address the issue before the trial court. 
FN5. Cf Johnson v. G7v of Boimiifui 996 
F.Supp. 1100. 1103 (D.Utah 1998) (ruling 
that "Utah requires strict compliance with 
the notice of claim provision. Nonetheless. 
'defects in the form or content of notices 
of claim do not always act to bar a claim.' 
By including the police report and inform-
ing Bountiful that Plaintiff was injured, the 
letter may satisfy the first required element 
of a notice of claim/* (citation and em-
phasis omitted)). 
f 28 Accordingly, I also would reverse the trial 
court's dismissal, but remand for the purpose of 
conducting a fact inquiry to determine whether the 
aforementioned purposes have been satisfied. See id 
Utah App...2004. 
Peeples v. State of Utah 
100 P.3d 254. 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. 2004 UT 
App 328 
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